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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

On Legalism, Popular Agency
and "Voices of Suffering":
The Nigerian National Human Rights
Commission in Context1
Obiora Chinedu Okafor* &
Shedrack C. Agbakwa**
The struggle for human rights will be won or lost at the national level. Unless we [i.e.
international human rights scholars] begin to study such struggles, we will neither
understand the most important issues nor be able to make the most effective possible
contribution to the realization of internationally recognized human rights.
Jack Donnelly 2
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The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission
The ... [Commission] is modest in its objectives and flexible in its means.
Obinna Okere3
[For human rights to really connect with human suffering] ...suffering humanity [must
be allowed to] reflect ... [and] thinking humanity [must] suffer.
Upendra Baxi 4

I. INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly being recognized in the relevant literature that, important
as they obviously are, international institutions cannot in themselves suffice
as the primary sites of the struggle(s) for human rights.' Concomitantly, it has
become as apparent that these imperative struggles must be won (or lost)
largely at the local level. 6 This realization has in turn exposed the critical
necessity for the deployment at the national level of various kinds of
resources for the promotion and protection of human rights. One of the
resources that could be so deployed is a national institution for the
promotion and protection of human rights. While recognizing the inherent
difficulties with definitions, the United Nations has defined such a national
institution as a body that has been established by a Government under the
constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically
defined in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights Similarly,
Mario Gomez has defined such bodies as state-sponsored and state-funded
entities set up under an Act of Parliament or under the Constitution, with the
broad objective of protecting and promoting human rights.8 These more
recent definitions specifically exclude from their purview institutions that
possess a more general mandate (such as the regular courts, the legislature
and the social welfare institutions of a state).9 Yet, as functionally appealing
as it now seems, this is a differentiation that was not always applied by the
United Nations. 10

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

See B. Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and
American Systems 6 HuM. RTS.Q. 141, 158 (1984). This quotation is an adaptation of
Okere's now famous characterization of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights as being of this same mold.
See Baxi, supra note 1 at 169.
See Donnelly, supra note 2.
Id.
See CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS:A HANDBOOK ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT
AND STRENGTHENING
OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONSFORTHEPROMOTION AND

8.
9.
10.

PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, UN Training Series No. 4, U.N. Sales No. E.95.XIV.2 at 9 39
(1995) (hereinafter "UN HANDBOOK").
See Mario Gomez, Sri Lanka's New Human Rights Commission, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 281
(1998).
UN HANDBOOK, supra note 7, !f 36-37.
Id.

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Vol. 24

As defined by the United Nations, national human rights institutions are
by no means a novel feature either of the human rights landscape or of the
institutional terrain of most countries in the world." From ombudspersons to
national human rights commissions, the institutional terrain of virtually
every country features at least one kind or the other of a national institution
for the promotion and protection of human rights. 2 As well, the vastly
increased worldwide attention that is now being paid to the development of
such national institutions belies the relatively long (if hitherto unremarkable)
history of their existence in various parts of the world. Indeed, the question
of the necessity for the establishment of such institutions was discussed by
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as far back as
1946.13 This matter was again discussed by ECOSOC in 1960.14 As
importantly, the first set of guidelines for the structure and functioning of
national institutions was endorsed by the United Nations in the late 1970s."5
Long as their history might be, it is correct nevertheless to perceive the
1990s and the period that has followed as the age of national human rights
institutions. This age has witnessed the accordance by the United Nations of
priority to this aspect of the struggle for human rights. 16 This age has also
witnessed the exponential and exuberant proliferation of national institutions the world over. 17 Receiving impetus from the 1991 Paris International
Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, and the conclusions of that conference (now known as the
Paris Principles),18 the work of the United Nations in encouraging the
establishment by each state of its own national institution(s) has gained
momentum. The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action's19
ringing endorsement of this aspect of the United Nations human rights work
has further cemented its pride of place within that body's agenda.
Particularly popular among states that have recently established their
own national institutions has been the subcategory of national institutions
that are referred to as national human rights commissions (NHCs).2 ° This

11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

For instance, Sweden has an Ombudsperson since 1809.

Hereinafter referred to as "national institutions."
See ECOSOC Resolution 2/9 of 21 June 1946.
See ECOSOC Resolution 772B (XXX) of 25 July 1960.
See UN HANDBOOK, supra note 7, 9T 22-23.
Id. 99 20-35.
Id.
These principles have been endorsed by U.N.G.A. Res. 48/134, 20 Dec. 1993. The
Paris Principles are annexed to this resolution.
32 I.L.M. 1661, Pt. I, 1 36 (1993). For an extensive discussion of this document and the
World Conference on Human Rights at which it was produced, see Stephen Marks,

Nightmare and Noble Dream: The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights 53
L. J. 54 (1994).
See UN HANDBOOK, supra note 7 at 7-9, 919 46-62.
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subcategory is said to differ significantly from another subcategory referred
2 1
While the primary function of the latter kind of
to as Ombudspersons.
institution is the oversight of public administration in order to ensure its
fairness and legality, that of the former is the promotion and protection of
the human rights of individuals and groups. 2 While these functions will in
many cases overlap, the former institution is thus functionally distinguishable from the latter. It is on one example of that kind of national institution,
on a specific body that fits within the subcategory of NHCs, that this paper
will focus.
The Nigerian NHC was born about five years ago in a time that was, for
the vast majority of Nigerians, one of great adversity.23 Sired by the
Government of General Sani Abacha, 24 a regime that had by the relevant
time achieved notoriety as perhaps the most rapacious and oppressive in
Nigeria's short but checkered national history, the establishment of this
body was widely viewed (quite understandably) as a red herring, as a design
to deflect attention from that regime's ultra-dismal human rights record, and
as an entirely cynical move on the part of that regime.2 5 As one keen
observer of the Nigerian NHC26 noted: "The [Nigerian] National Human
Rights Commission came amidst skepticism [sic] and cynicism that the
Commission was a mere propaganda tool in the hands of a junta seeking
international relevance."

27

Not surprisingly, another well-versed observer of the human rights
scenes in most of Africa shared this understandable skepticism. 28 In his
view: "The Nigerian example of the creation of the National Human Rights

21.
22.
23.

24.
25.

26.
27.
28.

Id. at 8-9, -J 56-62.
Id. at 7-9 91 46-62.
See O.N. OGBu, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICEIN NIGERIA: AN INTRODUCTION 300 (1999). It
is interesting that as far back as 1993, a Nigerian scholar (who is currently a high court
judge) had, in his LL.M. thesis at the University of Nigeria, recommended the
establishment of a similar body. See Interview with "NCC" (not his real name), on 11
Apr. 2000 (the transcripts of this interview are on file with the authors).
See The National Human Rights Commission Decree No. 22 of 1995, Supplement to 82
Official Gazette Extraordinary of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, pt. A, 6 Oct. 1995
(hereinafter "Decree").
See THISDAY, 28 Mar. 2000, at 3 (where the founding Chair of the Nigerian NHC, Justice
P.K. Nwokedi, noted that "a majority of Nigerians never had any faith in the
Commission as a result of its birth during the regime of General Sani Abacha"). All the
same, it is noteworthy that article 26 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights actually mandates all states parties to establish new, and improve existing, NHCs.
See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 26, adopted 27 June 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982).
Hereinafter referred to as the "NNHC."
See Vanguard, 17 June 1999 (on file with authors).
See Quashigah, infra note 76 at 134.
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Commission by the dictatorial Abacha regime was a typical example of this
29
effort by [some] African leaders to hoodwink the international community."
Thus, just like the regime that established it, NNHC was widely
expected to become a dismal failure. Five years later, that body struggles on.
Human rights violations are no longer as massive or wanton as they were at
the time of its birth, yet they persist with a level of frequency that remains
disturbing. In the context of the understandable skepticism that greeted its
establishment and the continuance even today of most of the conditions of
immiseration that existed at that time, it seems important to assess the
NNHC's performance in the short but significant period that it has
functioned. Has it failed in its mandate of promoting and protecting human
rights in Nigeria?
Any such evaluation must, however, be based on a clear understanding
of the nature of the performance standard(s) against which the NNHC is
assessed. Such assessments invariably involve explicit or implicit comparisons.3 0 One should, thus, know and be clear about what one is comparing
the NNHC to. As Rhoda Howard has noted, "[olne needs to be aware of the
comparisons one is making." 31 Even more important, the adequacy of the
very standard(s) against which the extant institution is being compared must
be examined very critically. To take for granted that the relevant standard(s)
are above reproach is to risk subscription to a fundamentally flawed
evaluative process and style. Too often, such standard(s) are either important
but insufficient, or altogether flawed.
In this article, we want to achieve two broad objectives. The first is to
examine more critically the dominant set of standards against which NHCs
have been evaluated in the pre-existing literature. it has been contended
that this dominant set of standards has together constituted a deeply
ingrained conception of an ideal NHC against which all NHCs must be
assessed. The question is therefore the extent to which this conception of an
ideal NHC is either adequate or flawed (in the sense of significant
incompleteness). It is hoped that a critical review of this dominant
conception will point to a more compelling and more holistic conception of
NHCs and their work, one that is at once accommodating of the dominant
conception as well as less legalistic, more cognitive of popular agency, and
more deeply connected to those that Upendra Baxi has quite appositely
referred to as the "voices of suffering."32 The second broad objective is to

29.
30.
31.

Id. at 142. John Gotanda has described the Indonesian NHC during the Suharto regime
as in substantially the same terms. See JY. Gotanda, infra note 76 at 477.
See Rhoda Howard, Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: Some Problems of Implicit
Comparisons, 6 HUM. RTS.Q. 160, at 161 (1984).
Id.
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evaluate the performance of the NNHC in its first five years of operation.
We propose to do so against the more holistic conception of and vision for
NHCs in general. We will suggest that, allowing for some contextual
variations, an NHC that is conceived of in accordance with this more
holistic vision has a much better chance of achieving its sacred mission of
transforming effectively the human rights situation of victimized individuals
and groups within its target society.
To this end, we have organized the rest of the paper into three broad
sections. Part II of the paper will develop a set of related ideas. The first is
the idea that the United Nations has formulated and applied a set of
standards for the evaluation of NHCs, standards that have together constituted the dominant conception of an ideal NHC. The second is the idea that
this dominant UN-driven conception of the ideal NHC is shared by virtually
every scholar, nongovernmental organization, and governmental body that
has commented on the effectiveness of NHCs. And the third is the idea that
this dominant conception is significantly limited, and requires fundamental
enlargement and revision if the NHCs that are animated by its vision are to
have a higher transformative potential. Such an enlarged, revised, and more
holistic vision of NHCs is then offered. The purpose of this reevaluation of
the dominant conception will be to deepen, extend, and enlarge the UNdriven dominant conception of NHCs, rather than to abandon that conception in its entirety. There is little that is inherently wrong as such with any of
the specific detailed requirements that constitute the dominant conception
of the ideal NHC. The point is that those requirements are, when read
together, either incomplete as a desideratum for the success of NHCs, or
insufficiently oriented toward the features and modes of operation that are
most crucial to the attainment of the stated objectives of NHCs the world
over. In Part III of the paper, we will assess the performance of the NNHC in
the first five years of its existence. Our evaluation of this young body will be
animated by the more holistic conception of the ideal NHC that we
developed in Part II of the paper. Thereafter, we will, in Part IV, conclude the
paper by musing on the future of the NNHC, and of NHCs in general.

II. IMAGINING THE "IDEAL" NATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
In this section of the paper, we will develop the first set of suggestions that
we made in Part I above. These are that the UN's set of standards regarding
the establishment of NHCs the world over have together constituted the

32.

See Baxi, supra note 1.
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dominant conception of the ideal type of NHC; that this dominant
conception is shared by virtually every scholar, NGO, or governmental
body that has been relevant to the development of NHCs; that this dominant
conception is inadequate to animate the establishment of the kinds of NHCs
that have the best chance of transforming fundamentally the human rights
situations of individuals and groups in the societies in which they operate;
and that a more holistic conception of the ideal NHC is required if these
bodies, animated as they often are by the UN conception, are to maximize
their ability to positively affect the material and psychological conditions in
which the people of their target societies live. Following this discussion, and
remaining conscious of the many pitfalls of over generalization, we will
conclude this section of the paper by offering our own understanding of
what such a holistic conception of the ideal NHC might look like.

A. The United Nations Conception of the
"Ideal" National Human Rights Commission
The task that we want to accomplish in this subsection is to demonstrate our
suggestion that the UN has developed a set of standards for the establishment and evaluation of NHCs that, taken and read as a whole, reveals the
existence of a certain broad conception of the ideal kind of NHC, one that
has now become dominant.
This dominant conception of NHCs is reflected quite clearly in the texts
of a number of UN-driven documents concerning the question of the nature
and effectiveness of NHCs. The first of these is the 1991 Paris Principles
Relating to the Status of National Institutions for the Protection of Human
Rights.33 The second is the UN Handbook.3 4 The third is the UN Fact Sheet
on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights. 3s And the last is the 1978 Guidelines on the Structure and Functioning of the National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights.

36

The central message that is conveyed by the Paris Principles is that, with
relatively minor adjustments for context, an NHC that possesses a particular
minimum content and looks to a great extent like the kind of institution that
is imagined and pictured by that document has the best chance of affecting
positively and transforming significantly the human rights situation of the

33.
34.

35.
36.

Gomez, Sri Lanka's New Human Rights Commission, supra note 8.
UN HANDBOOK, supra note 7.

Fact Sheet No. 19, available at <http/www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm> (visited 6 May 2002) (hereinafter "UN Fact Sheet").
UN HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 4, 9] 22 (hereinafter "1978 Guidelines").
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individuals and groups that live within its target society. So, the more a
particular NHC looks like that imagined and pictured by the Paris Principles, the more likely it is to be effective. Regardless of the accuracy of this
specific evaluative message, it is clear from a reading of this document that
it imagines, pictures, and presents a particular kind of NHC as the ideal or
optimal type that ought to be replicated, as much as context allows, in every
society the world over. As the Asia Pacific Forum on National Human Rights
Institutions has succinctly noted: "The

. .

. 'Paris Principles' [document] is

important because it sets out to clarify the concept of a 'national institution'
by providing minimum standards
on the status and advisory role of national
" 7
human rights commissions.

1

A detailed description and analysis of the content of this document will
suffice to demonstrate this point. According to the Paris Principles, the kind
of NHC that it envisions shall at a minimum be:
(a) vested with competence to promote and protect universal human rights
3
standards. 1
(b) given "as broad a mandate as possible,"39 including the responsibility of:

(i) submitting to any of the arms of government opinions, on an advisory
basis, recommendations, proposal and reports on any matters concerning

the promotion and protecting of human rights. Such advisory responsibilities shall include offering advice on the conformity or otherwise of existing

or proposed legislation with human rights principles; any situation of
violation of human rights; the preparation of reports on the human rights
situation in the country as a whole, or in one section thereof; and drawing
the attention of the government to, and commenting on, the situation in
40
any part of the country involving the violation of human rights;
(ii) promoting and ensuring the harmonization of national legislation,
regulations and practices with the international human rights instruments
41
to which the state is a party;
(iii) encouraging the relevant state's ratification of, or accession to, all the
42
relevant international human rights instruments;
(iv) ensuring the effective implementation of all the national legislation and

international instruments that impose human rights obligations on the
43

government;
(v) contributing to the human rights reports that states are required to

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See <http:/www.apf.hreoc.gov.au/un-national/paris-principles/> (visited 6 May 2002).
Paris Principles, supra, note 18 at pt. I, !U 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

pt.
pt.
pt.
pt.
pt.

I, 912.
I, 9 3 (a)(i)-(iv).
I, 91 3(b).
I, 91 3(c).
I,
3(b) & (c).
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and expressing an
submit to various international bodies and committees,
4
independently formed opinion on those reports;
4
(vi) cooperating with relevant international bodies;
(vii) assisting in the formulation and execution of programs for the teaching
into human rights in educational institutions and profesof and research
46
sional circles;

(viii) publicizing human rights and increasing public awareness, through
providing information, education, and making use of all press organs.4 7
(c) established and empowered by a constitutional or legislative text.48
(d) guaranteed operational independence by this enabling text. Such independence is to be partly achieved by the grant of a fixed and stable tenure (i.e. a
specific, if renewable, duration of their mandate) to the members of the
49
commission .
(e) composed of a plural membership. This is explicitly stated as implying the
pluralist representation of the social forces of civilian society involved in the
promotion and protection of human rights. These social forces are named as
inclusive of representatives of human rights NGOs, trade unions, concerned
social and professional organizations such as the bar and medical associations
of the country, academics and other experts, members of parliament, and trends
in philosophical or religious thought. Representatives of government departments may serve on these bodies in an advisory capacity only. 0
(f) autonomous of the three arms of the government."'
(g) given adequate powers of investigation. This shall include the power to
delve into any questions falling within its competence (on its own initiative or
otherwise); hear any person; obtain any information or document; address
public opinion directly; meet on a regular basis; establish working groups from
among its members; set up local and regional offices; and liase with NGOs. 2
(h) provided with adequate resources (especially funding, infrastructure and
staff). It is also to have independence from the financial control of the
53

government.

The Paris Principles also provide that an NHC may be vested with
jurisdiction to hear and consider complaints and petitions concerning
individual situations.1 4 The relevant NHC is to receive such complaints and

44.

Id. pt. I, 1 3(d).

45.

Id. pt. I, 113(e).

46.

Id. pt. I, 1 3().

47.

Id. pt. I, ']] 3(g).

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

52.

Id. pt. III, T 1 (a)-(g).

53.

Id. pt. II, 1 2.

pt.
pt.
pt.
pt.

I, % 2.
II, -9 3.
II, 91 1.
I, -E 3(d) & pt. II, 1 1, 2, & 3.

2002

The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission

petitions from the concerned person(s), her representatives, third parties,
NGOs, associations of trade unions, and other representative organizations."5 While this document does not require that every NHC shall possess
this kind of power, at the very least, its very inclusion in the principles (as an
additional power that might be vested in NHCs) suggests that it is a
desirable feature of an ideal NHC. It also suggests that it is a power that adds
"something" to the capacity of an NHC and enhances its effectiveness; a
level of attainment that most NHCs do in fact desire.
An analysis of the specific requirements for the establishment of NHCs
that have been detailed above indicates that when read together, these
principles do in fact constitute the Paris Principles' conception of the ideal
NHC. They are indicative of the kind of institution that was imagined,
pictured and presented to the world by the creators of the Paris Principles.
This ideal or optimal type is represented by an NHC that is: established and
run in a certain way; possesses a certain minimum level of autonomy and
independence; resourced in a certain way and up to a certain level; and has
certain kinds of powers and features. To be sure, this conception of an NHC
does not envisage one that is not established by any law at all; is not
mandated to promote and protect universal human rights standards; is not
given a broad mandate; does not have an advisory jurisdiction; is not
guaranteed independence by its enabling constitutional or legislative text; is
not composed of a plural membership; is not given adequate powers of
investigation; or is not provided with adequate resources. And while the
Paris Principles do envisage that some NHCs may not be vested with the
jurisdiction to hear and consider complaints, it still regards an NHC that is
vested with such powers as a desirable and optimal kind of NHC. This last
point will become much clearer after our discussion on the nature of the
dominant conception of NHCs within the scholarly and activist literature.
Concomitantly, this particular conception of the ideal or optimal type would
not accommodate an NHC that possesses any one of the following features:
establishment by executive fiat (e.g. a US President's executive order); a
narrow mandate that does not include concern for freedom of expression or
the right to health; a mandate that excludes the promotion and protection of
the international convention on the elimination of racial discrimination; a
membership that is removable at the discretion of the relevant Head of
State; a membership that is for instance composed of a substantial number
of the representatives of the relevant Ministry of Defense; operational and
financial control by the relevant Minister of Justice; a budget that is lower
than 30 percent of the amount that has been determined as necessary for it

54.
55.

Id. pt. IV.
Id.
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to carry out its duties; and a lack of the power to investigate the activities of
the armed forces and the police. This, of course, does not mean that were an
NHC to fall short of the ideal (in the sense of the presence of any one of
these features), it would not be recognized by the Paris Principles as an
NHC. The point is that such a body would not be viewed as an ideal or
optimal kind of NHC. Such a body will definitely not be one of those that
the drafters of that document will recommend to other states as an example
of a "good" NHC.
For its part, the UN Handbook conveys virtually the same message as
the Paris Principles. Largely inspired and animated by the latter,5 6 it holds
out a particular kind of NHC, with a particular minimum content, a
particular set of powers, functions, and capacities, and a particular approach to its work, as the ideal kind of NHC that with relatively minor
adjustments for context ought to be reproduced everywhere in the world.
This is so despite the fact that, unlike the Paris Principles, this document
contains an explicit denial in this respect. Paragraph four of the UN
Handbook declares that the document: ". . . is not a blueprint for legislation.
It is not prescriptive and does not set out to create a prototype or 'ideal'
institution against which the effectiveness of all others may be measured.
7
There can be no model institution and there are no set rules."1
While the UN Handbook's vision of NHCs is clearly based on a set of
guidelines, as opposed to legally imperative demands or a set of rules, these
guidelines still provide us with a detailed and rich composite picture of the
kind of NHC that it would consider ideal; each guideline forms one part or
the other of this picture. At a minimum, it still specifies the content of the
minimum core of features that a "good" or optimal NHC must possess. A
detailed analysis of these guidelines will suffice to demonstrate this point.
According to the UN Handbook, the kind of NHC that it envisions as
ideal for most contexts and as likely to be most effective in most contexts
shall, at a minimum, possess:
(a) enough "qualified independence" of action, independence through legal
and operational autonomy, independence through financial autonomy, independence through appointment and dismissal procedures, and independence
through composition, to be distinguishable from government instrumentalities;- B
(b) a defined subject-matter jurisdiction that is couched so as to avoid overlap
and conflicts with the functions of other judicial and administrative bodies; 9

56.

See UN HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 1, 1 4.

57.

Id. at 1, % 4. See also id. at 10, T 64 (declaring that "it is not the purpose of this
handbook to ignore essential differences, and to promote a prototype or model
institution.").
Id. at 10-12, 9] 70-85.

58.
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(c) adequate powers 0backed by sanction that are sufficient to discharge its
6
functions effectively;
(d) sufficient accessibility to those individuals and groups that it has been
established to serve (including making itself known to them, physical accessibility, and accessibility through a representative composition); 6
(e) the willingness and capacity to cooperate with other institutions and NGOs,
62
nationally, regionally and internationally;
63
(f) efficiency and effective work methods;
64
(g) sufficient human and financial resources;
(h) sufficient accountability to the government and/or parliament, as well as to
65
the public;
(i) a promotional and educational mandate, including collecting, producing,
and disseminating information materials; organizing promotional events; liaising with the media; ensuring the visibility of the institution and its work;
66
educating various groups; and conducting seminars and educational programs;
(j) a broad advisory jurisdiction which should include the review of legislation;
provision of general policy and administrative advice to the government on
local and international human rights matters; provision of assistance to the
government in the drafting of its reports to international bodies; and provision of
67
assistance to the government in the development of national action plans;
(k) an effective investigative mechanism that is characterized by adequate legal
capacity, organizational competence, a defined and appropriate set of priorities,
68
and the political will to pursue its work;
(I) the power to make recommendations, refer matters to another responsible
69
agency, and/or make determinations
(m) the power to conduct investigations or public inquiries suo motu; 0
(n) the power to intervene in legal proceedings."
A close analysis of the guidelines contained in the UN Handbook
exposes their deep connection to the Paris Principles. They are in fact
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detailed renditions and explications of the latter guidelines. They are
scarcely different, either in content or orientation, from the Paris Principles.
Where differences exist, they do not seem to be significant at all, at least
from the perspective of their conformity with the vision of NHCs that is
presented by the Paris Principles. Indeed, the guidelines in the UN
Handbook offer a composite picture of the kind of NHC that would be
considered ideal or optimal by the United Nations: one that is virtually
identical to that presented by the Paris Principles. Every single one of the
Paris Principles' requirements for the establishment of a viable NHC
(detailed in sub-section A of this section of the paper) is reproduced in the
UN Handbook. For instance, items (a), (b), (d) and (f)-(h) above (culled from
the UN Handbook) are detailed renditions of items (d)-(f) and (h) of our
summary of the Paris Principles. It is true of course that in the course of
providing a more detailed version of the standard UN conception of the
ideal NHC, the UN Handbook has introduced a small number of new
guidelines that were not explicitly mentioned by the Paris Principles.
However, such new guidelines lie implied within, and are clearly animated
by the more general formulations contained in the Paris Principles. Thus,
the UN Handbook's principal contribution has been to deepen our view of
the intricacies of the standard UN conception of the ideal kind of NHC.
Clearly, it has not offered an alternative conception at all. The UN
Handbook has itself admitted this fact by declaring early on (in its general
introduction) that: "It should be noted that the . . . 'Paris Principles' have
been particularly important in this respect [i.e. regarding the formulation of

its content] .172

As importantly, the UN Fact Sheet 73 conveys this same message. In
addition to several pages of information on the necessity for NHCs and
other national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights,
this document contains a summary of the guidelines that are contained in
the Paris Principles, guidelines that are also endorsed therein.74 For this
reason, the propositions we have offered, and the arguments we have made,
regarding the conception of the ideal NHC that is presented by the Paris
Principles apply to the Fact Sheet as well.
For its own part, despite the fact that it does of course possess and
convey a specific vision of the ideal or "good" NHC, the particular
conception of a model NHC that is evinced by the 1978 Guidelines is far
less detailed than that conceived by the other relevant UN documents. For
this reason, and for the reason that this document is now quite dated, our
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Id. at 1, %4.
UN Fact Sheet, supra note 35.
Id. at 9-13 (Internet copy).

2002

The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission

analysis of the nature of the kind of NHC that is imagined by the United
Nations as the ideal type will concentrate on the first three documents that
we have examine-the Paris Principles, the UN Handbook, and the UN
Fact Sheet.
This analysis reveals that the guidelines contained in the three documents that we have chosen to focus on do harmonize quite well, and have
together constituted a decipherable, if broad, conception of the ideal NHC.
In each of these documents, this ideal type is imagined in virtually identical
ways. In each of them, the ideal (i.e. optimal) NHC is imagined as one that
has been established by a constitution or legislation; is vested with
competence to promote and protect universal human rights standards; is
independent de facto and de jure of all the branches of the national and
sub-national governments; is given as broad a mandate as possible; is
composed of a plural membership that does not include representatives of
government departments; is afforded adequate powers of investigation; is
provided with adequate resources; controls its own finances and budget;
and is vested with jurisdiction to hear and consider complaints. It is of
course recognized by us that this dominant conception is flexible to some
extent. After all, no guidelines are entirely inflexible. Guidelines such as the
ones that constitute the dominant conception of NHCs are inherently
accommodating of some level of difference among various NHCs. Does not
the UN Handbook note that as long as a particular NHC is both appropriate
for, and effective within, the context in which it operates, it is the one that
75
"is best suited to its [the country's] needs," and is therefore acceptable?
The point though is that the level of difference that these particular
guidelines allow is sufficiently minimal as to produce a relatively clear
conception of the kind of NHC that would, from the point of view of these
documents, normally be ideal (at least in the sense of being the most
optimal in most contexts).
While the foregoing description and analysis has, at least from our
perspective, clearly demonstrated the proposition that these UN texts are
deeply animated by, and reflective of, one particular vision of the ideal
NHC, that discussion has offered little evidence that might substantiate the
related proposition that this specific UN-driven vision has now become the
dominant conception of NHCs the world over. Evidence for this last
proposition abounds nevertheless. This fact will become clear following our
examination in the next subsection of the conception of the ideal NHC in
the mainstream scholarly and activist literature in this area.

75.
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B. The Conception of the "Ideal" -National Human Rights Commission
in the Mainstream Scholarly and Activist/NGO Literature
Having already demonstrated our suggestion that the United Nations has
established a set of standards for the establishment and evaluation of NHCs
that together constitute that global institution's particular conception of an
ideal NHC (i.e. a composite picture of what a "good" NHC should look like
or, at the very least, approximate), we shall now proceed with the task of
pushing forward the overall argument that we seek to make in this section of
the paper. What we want to do in the present subsection is to develop
further the first set of suggestions that we offered in Part I of the paper. We
will do so by examining the nature of the particular conception of the ideal
NHC that is evident in the relevant mainstream scholarly and activist
literature. Here, it will be suggested that this body of literature shares and
reproduces, almost without exception, the same picture of the ideal or
optimal kind of NHC that is constituted by the guidelines that have been
offered in the relevant UN texts. Indeed, virtually every single item in this
literature explicitly admits as much. A by-product of this discussion will be
the exposure of the extent to which the UN conception has become
dominant across the globe, and has deeply influenced and animated the
very architecture and operation of virtually every existing or proposed NHC.
The scholarly literature that is relevant to the topic of NHCs (and related
bodies) has multiplied exponentially in the last few years. 6 The sheer

76.
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numerical size of this literature reflects the growth of interest in the subject
among scholars. It also reflects the deep influence that the UN's own work
in this area has had on the development of this body of scholarly literature.
As the United Nations interest in the subject grew and became established,
so did the interest of scholars in this area. However, as we shall soon show,
the influence that the United Nations work has had on this body of literature
has not at all been limited to its numerical expansion. More important, this
admittedly diverse body of scholarship has, to a vast extent, been deeply
marked by a fundamental fidelity to the same texts that have formed and
produced the United Nations conception of the ideal or optimal NHC. As
such, as we shall demonstrate very shortly, despite its geo-cultural diversities of origin, this body of literature has been almost completely marked, as
well, by a fundamental fidelity to the United Nations conception of the ideal
or optimal NHC. A detailed examination of this body of scholarship will
suffice to demonstrate this point. This examination is sufficient as well to
demonstrate the deeply ingrained dominance of the United Nations conception of the ideal NHC, in the writings of this diverse group of "NHC
scholars," as well as in the architecture of the vast majority of existing and
proposed NHCs. A detailed examination of a representative sample of the
relevant literature suffices to prove this point.
Linda Reif's very important recent article on this subject77 exemplifies
the extent to which even those scholars that do recognize the fact that the
viability of an NHC depends not merely on its legal framework, but on other
social, political and economic factors as well, 7 have still maintained a
fundamental fidelity to the United Nations conception of the ideal NHC.
Having declared that NHCs and other national institutions can still play a
valuable role in human rights protection without having the power to legally
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bind any person,79 and having critiqued the Paris Principles on two
grounds, 80 in developing her own conception of an ideal or optimal NHC
Reif still relies almost entirely on the indices and guidelines that are stated
in the UN Handbook.8 1 She acknowledges that seven of the eleven factors
that she views as the desiderata for the viability and success of an NHC, and
thus as constitutive of her own conception of an ideal or optimal NHC, are
culled directly from the UN Handbook. In Reif's own words:
The United Nations High Commission for Human Rights has stated [in the UN
Handbook] that there are six [sic] "effectiveness factors" generally applicable to
all national human rights institutions: independence, defined jurisdiction, and
adequate powers, accessibility, cooperation, operational efficiency, and accountability. 2I include these six [sic] factors within a larger group of effectiveness factors .

Yet, even those factors that at first glance Reif seemed to have developed are
explicitly or impliedly endorsed in the UN Handbook and/or the Paris
Principles. These factors are: (a) the democratic governance structure of the
state; (b) the personal character of the person(s) appointed to head the
institution; (c) the behavior of the government in not politicizing the
institution and in having a receptive attitude toward its activities; and (d) the
credibility of the office in the eyes of the populace.8 Each of these factors is
either mentioned or implied in the UN Handbook. Item (a) above is implied
in virtually all the sections of the UN Handbook. While it is not listed in the
UN Handbook as one of the so-called "effectiveness factors," from the
discussion in paragraph 164 about training members of the legislature
through the discussion in paragraph 187 about the receptiveness of a
government to the advice of the relevant NHC as being crucial to its
effectiveness to the discussion in paragraphs 68-85, the unstated but
underlying assumption of the UN Handbook is the same as Reif's: the more

79.
80.

81.
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83.

Id.
These grounds are that: (a) the Paris Principles were drafted with only the classic NHC
model in mind and do not as such provide adequate guidelines for the design and
operation of other kinds of national institutions for the protection of human rights such
as ombudspersons and hybrid ombudspersons that possess a human rights jurisdiction
as well; and (b) that the Paris Principles should not have allowed any discretion to states
as to whether or not the NHCs they establish should have the power to hear and
consider complaints and petitions since, in her view, every NHC should have that
power. See id. at 24.
Id. at 23-24.
Our own count of the factors that are mentioned in her article reveal seven of them, but
this may be a numerical difference that depends on whether one views the phrase
"defined jurisdiction, and adequate powers" either as one factor, or as two factors. This
is, however, not a point of major importance. Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
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democratic a regime really is, the more likely the relevant NHC is to
succeed. Item (b) above is implicit as well in the UN Handbook. It is the
unstated assumption of that document, especially in paragraphs 68-85, that
the members of the NHC shall be persons who are of strong, independent,
and pro-human rights character. This is so because the aim of the discussion
in those paragraphs is to prevent these persons from being controlled or
influenced by the government, an ambition that would be nonsensical were
it not already assumed that these persons possessed the right kind of
character for the job! Item (c) above is explicitly set out in paragraphs 18789 of the UN Handbook and is implied elsewhere. Item (d) above is implied
throughout the same document, and explicitly referred to in the last
sentence of paragraph 138 thereof. Thus, Reif's contribution in the present
respect has been to tease out the factors relevant to the success of an NHC
and highlight their importance. In so doing, she has performed an important
service to the scholarly and activist human rights community. As importantly, the point that we are making is not that Reif is wrong to rely, as she
has, on the UN Handbook. Indeed, as we will see later on, the United
Nations conception of the ideal NHC and the heavy scholarly reliance on it
that we seek to demonstrate, is not wrong as such, just very limited. The
guidelines that constitute the UN conception can therefore be viewed as
important but insufficient (in both their orientation and content). To be clear,
the point that we are making is that, like the vast majority of scholars in this
area, Reif has been heavily, even if not exclusively, influenced by the UN
conception of the ideal NHC. As critical as she has been of the narrow sort
of legalism that has informed some conceptions of NHCs, her own
conception of the ideal NHC has remained virtually beholden to the United
Nations vision of those institutions. This is a point that has to be made in
order for us to move to the next stage of our project-which is to point to the
ways in which this particularly dominant conception of the ideal NHC can
be re-imagined so as to make it more capable of animating the design of
NHCs that are more likely to contribute effectively to the positive transformation of the human rights situations in most target societies. However, a
few more examples of how the scholarly literature has been marked by the
United Nations work in this area are appropriate at this point.
Vijayashri Sripati, an Indian scholar, has adopted and utilized a
conception of the ideal NHC that is no different from that preferred by
Reif.84 Indeed, she has explicitly adopted the UN conception as the standard
against which she has assessed India's NHC. In her own words: "The
Commission's role is assessed against the backdrop of the Paris Principles
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and the guidelines laid down in the United Nation's Handbook on National
Human Rights Institutions.""'
Now famous for his scholarship on NHCs, John Hatchard is still a good
example of a scholar that believes that "[t]here is no one model for a human
rights commission " 8 6 but whose work has nevertheless been heavily
influenced by the various relevant UN guidelines, and as such shares the
United Nations conception of the ideal NHC.8 7 Throughout this article, he
relies heavily on the relevant UN texts as constitutive of the standard against
which he evaluates the Ugandan NHC.88
As critical as he has been regarding the standard ways in which NHCs
have been imagined and operated, Gomez's declaration in his otherwise
thought-provoking article that the Sri Lankan NHC is a quite standard kind
of NHC (when viewed from the perspective of the Paris Principles) reveals
the very strong affinity between his own conception of an ideal NHC and
that of the United Nations.8 9
This significantly high level of affinity with the UN conception of the
ideal NHC is, as we have suggested already, evident as well in the work of
virtually every other scholarly commentator on the subject of NHCsY °
Interestingly, the synthesis of the main conclusions and recommendations of
the 2000 Summer Workshop on International Organization Studies jointly
organized by the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS)
and the American Society of International Law (ASIL) further justifies our
contention that the UN conception of the ideal NHC has had a somewhat
extraordinary amount of influence on the thinking of scholars in this area.9 1
There is nothing in this document that suggests otherwise. If anything, that
document strongly endorses the UN conception of the ideal NHC. The
same point is valid, as well, with respect to the vast majority of the literature
that has been produced by activists and NGOs on this subject.92
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From the foregoing extensive discussion, it has become quite clear that,
its merits or faults aside, the United Nations particular conception of the
ideal NHC has been the driving force behind the conceptualization of
NHCs in the scholarly and activist/NGO literature. It has also become clear
from this literature that this UN-driven conception has at the same time
heavily influenced and shaped the nature and orientation of the vast
majority of existing NHCs the world over. It is fair therefore to conclude, as
well, that the UN conception of the ideal NHC has now become dominant
the world over as a kind of standard to be achieved and as an evaluative
model. Again, this is not necessarily bad. Our point is that it is quite limited.
Our broad aims in this paper are to: (i) show that a particular, if
dominant, UN-driven conception of the ideal NHC currently exists; (ii)
show that conceptual model to be insufficient as it currently stands to
animate the establishment and operation of NHCs that are most likely to
become successful (in the sense of having the most possible positive
transformative impact on the human rights situation within most target
states); (iii) argue that a conception of NHCs that is less legalistic, more
cognitive of popular agency, and more deeply connected to the "voices of
suffering" within the target state, is much more likely to animate the kind of
NHCs that would be most valuable in most places and at most times; and
thereafter to (iv) assess the performance of the Nigerian National Human
Rights Commission (NNHC) against the standards of our preferred conception of the approximately ideal NHC.
We have already demonstrated the first broad point. Points (ii) to (iv)
remain untackled as yet. The next subsection of this part of the paper will
demonstrate points (ii) and (iii) above. Following this discussion, we will, in
Part III
of the paper, tackle the objective raised in point (iv) above.

C. Toward A More Holistic Conception of the
"Ideal" National Human Rights Commission
As we have already shown, the dominant conception of the ideal NHC is of
an institution that has been established by a constitution or legislation; is
vested with competence to promote and protect universal human rights
standards; is independent de facto and de jure of all the branches of the
national and sub-national governments; is given as broad a mandate as

tional Rights Journal is a publication of the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), an

organization that monitors human rights in Nigeria. Some issues of the journal are
archived on the CRP's website, available at <httpV/www.crp.org.ng> (visited 6 May
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possible; is composed of a plural membership that does not include
representatives of government departments; is afforded adequate powers of
investigation; is provided with adequate resources; controls its own finances
and budget; and is vested with jurisdiction to hear and consider complaints.
And as we have argued before, clearly, this dominant conception of the
ideal NHC does not envisage one that is not established by any law at all;
or is not mandated to promote and protect universal human rights
standards; or is not given a broad mandate; or does not have an advisory
jurisdiction; or is not guaranteed independence by its enabling constitutional or legislative text; or is not composed of a plural membership; or is
not given adequate powers of investigation; or is not provided with
adequate resources. It is also clear that while the relevant UN texts do
envisage that some NHCs may not be vested with the jurisdiction to hear
and consider complaints, those documents still regard the NHCs that are
vested with such powers as desirable and optimal kinds of NHCs. It is this
dominant conception of the ideal NHC that we want to assess critically in
the paragraphs that follow. We will do so as a prelude to a discussion of the
distinctive properties of the conceptual model that we prefer, i.e. the more
holistic conception of the ideal NHC. We will begin with our attempt to
problematize the dominant conception of the ideal NHC.
Our tasks in this subsection are thus to: assess critically the merits or
otherwise of the UN-driven dominant conception of the ideal NHC;
highlight the shortcomings of its content and orientation, i.e. its incompleteness; and develop a more holistic conception of NHCs-one that pictures
more completely the kind of NHC that is most likely to affect, in the most
positive way, the lives and circumstances of those who need such institutions the most. In particular, we are interested in assessing critically its level
of completeness as a standard conceptual model for the design, establishment, operation, and critical evaluation of NHCs. It is this conceptual
critique that will inform our attempt to develop thereafter a more holistic
conception of NHCs.
The principal points that we want to make are: (a) that the now
dominant UN-driven conception of the ideal or optimal NHC is so
significantly limited and incomplete as to require extension and enlargement, in order that the NHCs that are animated by its vision might, in most
contexts, have a higher transformative potential; and (b) that a more holistic
conception of NHCs, one that (i) shuns excessive legalism; (ii) accords
much more cognitive and operational priority to popular agency; and (iii)
connects much more deeply with the relevant society's most urgent "voices
of suffering," is much more likely to animate the kind of NHC that can
contribute most effectively to the positive transformation of the human
rights situation of the society in which it functions.
Again, just to be clear, our argument is not that this dominant

2002

The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission

conception is wrong per se. It is far from that-at least in the sense that any
one of the requirements that have been mentioned above ought not form
part of the guidelines for the establishment, operation, or evaluation of an
NHC (part of our mental picture of a "good" NHC). The point that we want
to make in this subsection is simply that this set of requirements is as a
whole incomplete, and is thus insufficient as a set of guidelines for the
establishment, operation, and evaluation of NHCs (for forming a mental
image of an ideal NHC). Our consequential argument is therefore that the
particular dominant conception of the ideal NHC that is entailed by the
content and orientation of these UN guidelines is similarly incomplete and
insufficient. We will now discuss, seriatim, the three broad shortcomings of
the dominant conception of an ideal NHC.
1. Excessive Legalism
Here our argument is that, for the most part, the dominant (UN-driven)
conception of an ideal NHC envisions an institution that is as "court-like" as
is possible, a body that as much as possible reproduces the basic features of
the traditional court-system, even as it takes on other kinds of "non-courtlike" functions like education and the provision of policy advice. In this
vision of the "good" NHC, too central and crucial a role is allowed to the
court-like features of NHCs, and too marginal a role is allowed to the noncourt-like features. This is not to argue, of course, that the UN texts and the
literature do not assign a sizeable role to the non-court-like features, or do
not view them as valuable. The argument is merely that these texts and
scholarly interventions have nevertheless continued to view the court-like
features as the more important of the two. At times, this view is implied. On
other occasions, it has been explicitly stated. Interestingly, even those
scholars that recognize the limitations of this form of legalism are never
quite able to escape its stranglehold.
Vijayashri Sripati's extraordinarily important contribution to our understanding of the concept and operations of NHCs is allegorical of the
dominant pattern in the rest of the relevant literature.93 It is allegorical of a
pattern of succumbing to the lure of "excessive legalism" even while
critiquing it; this is a paradox that is extensively palpable within this body of
scholarship. At first, Sripati strongly and convincingly argues that, of
necessity, the effective protection of human rights requires flexible mechanisms of a type that the traditional complaint-oriented court system cannot
provide (suggesting a measured departure from a court-centric vision of
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NHCs).14 Yet she goes on to complain at length that the work of the Indian

NHC has been greatly impeded because it has no effective enforcement
mechanisms of its own (succumbing to a rather court-centric vision of
NHCs).9 5 She also argues later on in this same paper that the Indian NHC
needs to focus much more on reviewing legislation for human rights
compliance 6 (as if the courts do not already perform this function, and as if
the deployment of a large percentage of the resources and energies of NHCs
in the direction of legislative reform has a high likelihood of transforming
the human rights situation of Indian society). While these two suggestions
are neither unviable nor undesirable per se (indeed both judicial enforcement and law reform are themselves very important elements in the overall
human rights struggle), the weight assigned to them does betray a subtle, but
still evident, form of thinking that is overly legalistic in the circumstances.
That Sripati's reasoning remains captive to the excessive legalism that
permeates the literature is confirmed by her subsequent conclusions that
one of the most important ways to improve the Indian NHC and make it a
more ideal or optimal institution is to expand its powers to include the
authority to prosecute civil servants and enforce its own decisions. Clearly,
like most other legal scholars, Sripati's vision for NHCs has remained
heavily influenced by the features of the traditional court system and the
presumed merits of such features (mostly the legally binding nature and
enforceability of a court's decisions, and its ability to impose sanctions).
While she has made other kinds of prescriptions for reform, the vast majority
of these prescriptions for the improvement of the performance of the Indian
NHC have been legalistic in nature. Implied in this trend of thought is a
conception of the ideal NHC that assigns a somewhat excessive role to
"formal legal powers" and "enforcement." It is almost as if it is settled
wisdom that the success of the Indian or any other NHC mostly depends on
the nature and extent of its
formal legal powers. As we will soon suggest this
9 7
is probably not the case.

This overly legalistic, yet dominant, conception of the ideal NHC is
present as well in the writings of most "NHC scholars." A few examples will
suffice to make this point. For instance, while arguing that there "is no one
model for a Human Rights Commission," 98 John Hatchard has celebrated
the fact that the Ugandan NHC can enforce its own decisions.9 9 This is one
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of the obvious factors that led this keen scholar of NHCs to describe that
NHC as "arguably one of the most powerful human rights commissions in
the [British] Commonwealth." 100 Brice Dickson is of the view that the
litigating role is perhaps the most crucial of the many functions of NHCs. °1
And for his own part, John Hucker does not seem worried at all that the
Canadian NHC's major activity is the adjudication of complaints by persons
0 2
who believe that they have been discriminated against by another entity)
This is so despite the fact that the Canadian Human Rights Act (which
established the Canadian NHC) confers wide advisory, educational, promotional, and research powers on that institution. 103 Again, the point is not that
the concentration of the Canadian or any other NHC on its court-like
functions is wrong in itself. The point is to question the priority that has been
accorded to that function over the non-court-like functions of that body.
Again, the relevant UN texts are as reflective of this tendency to
"excessive legalism" as the scholarly literature. Five of the seven "effectiveness factors" suggested by the UN Handbook concern or are oriented
toward the formal legal structures and powers of NHCs.' 0 4 These are
independence, defined jurisdiction, adequate powers, accountability, and
accessibility. The measure of effectiveness is in this way heavily weighted in
favor of the formal legal structures and powers of an NHC. Thus, even
though the relevant UN texts view the effectiveness of an NHC as a function
of the ability of an NHC to positively affect the human rights situation of the
target society, these texts still regard the extent and nature of its formal legal
structures and powers as highly indicative of the likelihood that any NHC
will achieve that objective.
For one, this conception of an ideal NHC would not be as problematic
were NHCs not required to function in environments where courts exist
already. What, it must be asked, is the distinctive feature or comparative
advantage of an NHC if its critical or most important role in the human
rights struggle is to replicate the traditional court system or to substantially
function in the very same way as the traditional courts? It may, of course, be
offered in reply that NHCs do possess other features that the traditional
courts do not have (such as the power of investigation suo motu and the
authority to provide policy advice to the government). It may also be offered
in reply that, even if it is conceded that an ideal NHC is imagined in the
dominant conception as a court-like body, such an overly legalistic
approach is still appropriate since such NHCs might then become specialized human rights courts de facto.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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The answer to the first point is that, granted that NHCs have certain
additional features, and granted that courts already serve the function of
hearing complaints and ordering enforcement, the additional features that
NHCs possess ought to receive much more attention and emphasis in the
conception and operation of NHCs. These additional features (such as
promotion, education, policy advice, and suo motu investigations) ought to
receive priority, and achieve centrality, both in the design and operation of
these bodies. They ought to have the most prominent role as well in the
dominant conception of the ideal NHC. This should be so precisely
because, almost invariably, no other institution serves the non-court-like
functions of NHCs. Yet, the regular courts are there to fulfill the enforcement
and adjudication functions. Where these regular courts are ineffective, the
solution would be to work toward their effectiveness. It would not solve the
problem to merely create another de facto court in the name of establishing
an NHC. Such an NHC might still be ineffective nevertheless! The answer to
the second point is that if NHCs were de facto to become specialized
human rights courts, they would lose their distinctiveness as well. They
would abandon or seriously compromise their promotional, educational,
advisory, and suo motu investigative roles. Yet the performance of these
non-court-like roles are, in most places, arguably more critical to the longterm success of the human rights struggle than schemes for ex post facto
enforcement that are based on complaints-oriented mechanisms. The point
is not that the ideal NHC, however conceived, ought not possess adjudicative and enforcement (i.e. court-like) powers at all. Our beef is with the
extent of the role assigned to these court-like features in the design and
operation of NHCs. Our contention is that being too extensive, that role is
too excessive as well. Concomitantly, we are of the view that the role that is
normally assigned to the non-court-like features of NHCs is all-too-often too
limited; and that this role ought to become more central, and much more
extensive. Accordingly, the dominant conception of the ideal NHC ought to
regard such promotional, educational and advisory roles as more central
and important. This is not the case presently. Virtually all segments of the
literature, including the UN texts and the scholarly contributions have
assigned too extensive a role to the court-like features of NHCs in their
imagination of what an ideal NHC might look like. This is decipherable
both from their prescriptions as to the design of viable NHCs, and from the
tenor and orientation of their evaluations of the effectiveness of existing
NHCs. This is a surprising feature of the literature given the recognition in
much of it of the critical relevance of the non-court-like features of NHCs,
and given the prevalence within it of the argument that an NHC should not
be viewed as just another court, albeit a specialized one.
This is not to suggest, of course, that the literature does not at all
acknowledge the value of these non-court-like functions that NHCs per-
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form. Reif has for example endorsed the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights' conviction regarding the urgency of making
preventive strategies the centerpiece of the human rights struggle. 105 And
these non-court-like functions are basically preventive in nature. Reif has
also emphasized the importance of nonlegal factors to the effectiveness of
NHCs, 106 and has recognized the fact that an NHC can still play a valuable
role without possessing adjudicative and enforcement powers.107 Again, of
the eleven "effectiveness factors" that she suggests as contributory to the
successful performance of most NHCs in most places, five have more to do
with the play of domestic politics than with the formal legal structures and
powers of the NHC. 108
The point we want to put across, however, is that even a scholar such as
Reif who is well aware of the limits of an overly legalistic conception of
NHCs still retains a picture of an optimal or ideal NHC that assigns
relatively too much importance to the court-like functions that NHCs
sometimes perform. For instance, one of her two criticisms of the vision of
NHCs that is presented by the Paris Principles is that it does not make it
compulsory for all NHCs to possess the formal powers of investigation and
adjudication. In her view, all NHCs should possess that power. A necessary
implication of this view is that an NHC that does not possess that power is
somehow undesirable. She has in this way marked such court-like functions
as central to her vision of the ideal NHC. But is it not possible that an NHC
that has a purely policy advisory and educational role can make a valuable
contribution to the human rights struggle? Given the presence of the
traditional courts, is such an NHC necessarily of lesser value than one that
possesses the powers of investigation and adjudication? This is not to
suggest that NHCs should not possess investigative or adjudicative functions, but to argue that an NHC that does not possess such functions is not
necessarily doomed to fail or unviable, either. The policy, advisory and
educational roles of NHCs should not be undervalued at all. They may in
fact be the most crucial roles that such institutions can play, given the acute
need for the prevention a priori of human rights abuses. Formal legal
structures and powers aside, an NHC that is widely viewed as credible and
legitimate is far likely to perform more effectively than one that is widely
viewed as discredited or illegitimate. Important as they are, formal legal
structures and powers are, in themselves, quite insufficient to determine the
eventual success or failure of an NHC. They may not even be the most
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important factors in that regard. An analogy from Gadbois' study of the
Indian Supreme Court may be helpful in understanding this point. As
Gadbois has noted with respect to that court:
The Court is not strong and powerful because the constitution makes [formal]
provision for a strong court. .

.

.More important than the Supreme Court's

independence from the executive and formal power and authority, and without
which the Court could not be an important judicial institution, is the legitimacy
it enjoys, [otherwise] the Court's role in the political system would be minimal.
...The quantum of the court's power and authority is directly related to the
amount of legitimacy it possesses. 109
This important point (that it would be mistaken to view the most
important feature of NHCs as their formal legal structures and powers) is
complemented by a related argument. This is that it would be mistaken as
well to regard litigation and other court-like functions of NHCs as their most
important function. This point has been so well made by a British
Parliamentarian that it will suffice to reproduce her argument in extenso.
According to her:
I believe that the training and education of public bodies is just as important as
the establishment of case law .... I fear that, for the failure to train them in what

the [British Human Rights] Bill means, we shall see a great deal of litigation that
is unnecessary, expensive, slow, tedious and repetitive. 110
In sum, as Quashigah has noted, a very convincing case can be made that,
whatever its capacity to impose legally binding decisions, an NHC "has to
feed on its public confidence for its growth.""'
2. Insufficient Cognition of Popular Agency
Here, our argument is that the dominant conception of an ideal NHC
envisions an institution that can make a marked difference (almost entirely)
because of "what it does," "what it can do in itself" or how it conducts its
business; and that this prevalent vision of NHCs hampers the full and
complete (i.e., holistic) assessment of the potential and actual value of these
institutions. Our contention will be that in addition to envisioning an ideal
NHC as making a difference because of "what it does," observers of these
institutions should also envision such an ideal NHC as one that might be
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valuable because of "what other agents are able to do with it" (as a resource
that is valuable in the hands of popular agents such as civil society groups).
The point is not that what an NHC can itself do is not important. Indeed, it
is very important. The point is that the value of an NHC to the human rights
struggle and to society far extends beyond its own active contributions. We
will make this point by showing how local NGOs in Nigeria have been able
to achieve some successes that would not otherwise be achievable by using
the Nigerian NHC (NNHC) as a resource-by doing things with that
institution. But first, we must demonstrate our contention that the literature,
the theory, and the practice in this area have (relatively speaking) been
insufficiently cognizant of the immense value that popular agency (e.g.
NGO work) often brings to the work of NHCs (and have thus inadequately
accommodated this phenomenon in their conception of the ideal NHC).
This literature has failed to map in any substantial manner the ways in
which popular agents (especially civil society groups) have deployed NHCs
in order to reach news heights in the human rights struggle. It has thus
failed, in turn, to appreciate fully the value of the existence and work of
NHCs to the success of many projects initiated by human rights NGOs.
First of all, it is important to keep in mind the now well-known basic
fact that civil society groups and other extremely active popular agents
abound the world over in our time. In the case of the African continent,
Claude Welch has noted the fact that average Africans are well aware of
human rights issues, and have continued to work very hard to eliminate
abuses." 2 Indeed, as Welch has also noted, organized human rights groups
exist in most, if not all, African states." 3 Thus, in Africa (as the world over),
there is not a dearth of popular agents concerned to see a transformation in
the human rights situation of specific societies.
As we shall soon notice, however, the relevant body of literature has not
appreciated fully the implications of the existence (and workings) of such
popular agents for the ways in which the ideal NHC is conceived. This is
not to say, though, that the literature has totally neglected to comment on
the necessity for a close relationship between NGOs and NHCs. For
instance, nearly every scholarly commentary in this area has argued in favor
of close cooperation between NHCs and civil society groups (such as
human rights NGOs).114 The UN Handbook has also recommended such a
high level of cooperation between NHCs and NGOs.1 5 It considers that an
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ideal NHC would necessarily have close cooperative linkages with NGOs. u 6
In the words of the Handbook: "A national institution [such as an NHC]
should establish and maintain close contact with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community groups which are directly or indirectly
"7
involved in the promotion and protection of human rights."
Other scholars have noted and endorsed various other important ways
in which NGOs can make, and have made, valuable contributions to the
work of NHCs. Mageean and O'Brien have documented the extent to which
NGOs were consulted as to the content of the legislation that established
the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. 1 8 John Hatchard has
celebrated the process that allows NGOs in Malawi to nominate (and in
effect appoint), a large proportion of the members of that country's NHC.119
Sarah Spencer has noted that the South African NHC utilizes experts drawn
from both NGOs and the academe in its human rights policy development
work.1 20 And Gomez has advised the Sri Lankan NHC to begin to use NGOs
to investigate allegations of human rights violations
(in line with the practice
1 21
of the Indian Supreme Court on the matter).
The problem though is that most calls for closer NHC-NGO cooperation are premised on an evaluative paradigm that assesses NHCs and similar
institutions almost exclusively by reference to the active contributions of
such NHCs to the human rights struggle (i.e. "what has the relevant NHC
itself done"). In this system of evaluating NHCs, of assessing them for
compliance with the model of the "good" NHC, agency is ascribed almost
exclusively to the NHC. And even in those cases where agency is not so
exclusively ascribed to the NHC, the NHC is still imagined as the more
active of the two in their relationship one with the other. In most cases, the
NGO is viewed as the resource that the NHC deploys or utilizes. In such a
conceptual model, the NHC is the agent while the NGO is the resource.
Rarely, if ever, is this relationship imagined in the reverse. Rarely is the
NGO the agent and the NHC the resource.
The relevant literature is thus mainly in tune with the conceptual model
that almost invariably views the NHC as the agent, and regards the relevant
NGOs as resources. This conceptual model of NGO-NHC relations is not
wrong per se. It is just significantly limited. It is so limited chiefly because it
does not account for at least one important and valuable kind of relationship
between an NGO and an NHC: one in which the NGO is the agent, and the
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NHC the resource. 12 2 In this enlarged imagination of the value of NHCs,
these institutions are in addition conceived of as resources that might be
deployed in various creative ways by popular agents such as human rights
NGOs and community organizations, and agency is retained among the
populace.
A preliminary insight into the findings of our field study of the Nigerian
123
NHC and of the local NGOs that relate with it is illustrative of this point.
We utilize the views and activities of local Nigerian NGOs as our test of the
value of the Nigerian NHC (NNHC) as an NGO resource. We do so because
we agree with Pat Walsh that such local NGOs "are the best placed to pass
124
judgement on the [national human rights] institution in their country."
A few examples will suffice to demonstrate our point that an NHC might
be a valuable resource that popular agents such as NGOs can deploy
creatively. In particular, the first three examples illustrate how the NNHC
has been put to use by Nigerian NGOs enabling the relevant NGOs to
thereby achieve objectives that would have been much more difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve. The other examples illustrate the fact that local
NGOs in Nigeria have collaborated closely with the NNHC, an institution
that was established by a regime that earned a reputation as perhaps the
most brutal of all of Nigeria's military regimes! The first example concerns
the work done by one of the local NGOs known as "Community Action for
Popular Participation" (CAPP). This is an NGO that devotes the vast
majority of its resources to human rights education rather than litigation. For
nearly three years, try as they could, they failed to get the Nigerian Police
Force (NPF) to cooperate with them in permitting their officers to attend the
training workshops that they wanted to organize.'2 5 However, when once
they enlisted the help of the NNHC, they got the necessary cooperation
from the NPF. 2 6 Indeed, more police officers than anticipated attended this
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workshop and received training in the area of human rights.1 27 CAPP's view
is that these officers participated very actively and with an open mind. 28'
The second example concerns the work of Nigeria's most established
human rights NGO, "the Civil Liberties Organization" (CLO). The view of
this NGO is that, despite their initial skepticism about its viability, and
despite the fact that the NNHC has operated much more cautiously than the
NGOs would like, Nigerian NGOs have found the NNHC to be a very
useful ally and resource. 29' The CLO has cooperated with the NNHC with
regard to the execution of several successful projects, and have found such
collaboration quite useful for the prosecution of CLO's own objectives. 130 A
similar view has been expressed by "Human Rights Africa" (HRA), another
Nigerian NGO. 11 The HRA is of the view that it has found it very useful, if
not necessary, to work with the NNHC in the execution of that NGO's own
projects. 3 2 The next two examples relate to two human rights education
workshops organized by the "Center for Law Enforcement Education"
(CLEEN), and the "Shelter Rights Initiative" (SRI), respectively. The event that
was organized by CLEEN was a national seminar for police officers that was
attended by many of the most top-ranking Nigerian police officers. Needless
to say, the attendance of these top officers at this NGO workshop was
largely due to the fact that the workshop was jointly mounted by the NNHC
and CLEEN.1 33 The event that was organized by the SRI was a workshop for
High Court Judges on the judicial implementation of economic and social
rights. Again, this conference was reasonably well attended and successful,
134
owing at least in part to the collaboration of the NNHC with the SRI.
It is possible, of course, that a civil society group may not always act in
the interest of human rights (at least as that concept is conceived of by most
citizens in the context of the relevant country). For instance, Quashigah has
documented the South African NHC's complaints that the bulk of the media
in South Africa, having as they too often do a different ideological agenda,
have often hindered (rather than helped) the commission's work.1 3 1 While
this is possible, as the South African example suggests, it has not to date
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been a major source of worry for most NHCs in most places. Most local civil
society groups have been helpful. Very few of them have, like the bulk of
the media in South Africa, gone out of their way to promote an agenda that
is antithetical to the mandate of the relevant NHC.
In each of the above examples, the local NGO was the agent and the
NNHC the resource that was deployed creatively to achieve a pro-human
rights objective. In most of these cases, NGOs (as popular agents) were able
to harness the NNHC's comparative advantages of having a statutory right of
access to various governmental fora and departments, and having the
necessary perceived authority within the government. 13 6 In most of these
cases, had the relevant NGO not so deployed the NNHC, its objectives
would either not have been met, or would not have been met adequately. In
this way has the NNHC become a crucial resource for the success of the
work done by local NGOs in Nigeria. This is, at the very least, a preliminary
pointer in the direction of enlarging our conception of NHCs beyond what
has so far obtained in order to accommodate their usefulness as an NGO
resource. This is one major way in which the relevant literature can become
more cognizant of the value of the linkages between NHCs and NGOs; of
the imperative of taking popular agency seriously. Designers of NHCs
would do well to take this insight into consideration. By being more
available to be deployed as an NGO resource, an otherwise weak NHC
might be able to strengthen its popular legitimacy, and therefore its
influence on the government.
3. Inadequate Connection to "Voices of Suffering"
Here, our argument is that, for the most part, the dominant conception of an
ideal NHC envisions an institution that is not as adequately connected as it
should be to the yearnings and experiences of those among us that Upendra
Baxi has most accurately described as the "voices of suffering."137 The
argument is not that the dominant conception of NHCs is totally unaware of
the yearnings and experience of such persons. It does reflect these yearnings
and experiences to some extent. However, the dominant conception's
connection to these most vulnerable elements of society could be deepened
a lot more, in a way that would ensure that NHCs are in a much better
position to achieve their stated objectives. Much more attention needs to be
paid by the UN texts and the relevant literature to the logical and necessary
implications (for their conception of the ideal or optimal NHC) of the
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experiences and yearnings of these voices of suffering.138 Existing NHCs and
the architects of proposed NHCs also need to pay much more attention to
these voices. in both cases, the emphasis is on the phrase "much more." For
already some attention has been paid to these voices by the relevant bodies
and persons. The point is that the level of concern and the extent to which
these voices (and their concerns or experiences) have been reflected in the
conception, design and operation of NHCs has not been as adequate as
possible.
Put more concretely, a deeper and closer connection to these voices
should lead a "good" conception of an ideal or optimal NHC to pay closer
attention to the implications of certain issues, concerns, and matters that
deeply shape the immiseration of these voices of suffering (such as those
relating to children, ethnic and sexual minorities, gender, poverty, rural
dwellers, economic and social rights, prisoners, suo motu jurisdiction, the
activities of transnational corporations, the behavior of foreign governments, the activities of the international financial institutions, rapid reaction
capabilities, prevention, and structural and other root causes of violations).
By "voices of suffering" we mean those persons or groups whose need
for protection is greatest, who are society's most vulnerable, and who
survive at the bottom end of the scale of human freedom from want and
deprivation. The category refers therefore to those segments of humanity
who are the most vulnerable of all in most human societies. This is a
meaning that is substantially in conformity with the way in which that term
has been used in Baxi's own work. 139 We will illustrate our overarching
point here with reference to some of the categories/issues mentioned in the
preceding sentence, and through our examination of the UN texts and other
relevant literature.
The UN texts reveal a conception of the ideal NHC that is not as
adequately connected as it should be to the yearnings and experiences of
the voices of suffering. It needs an increased level of connection to these
voices in order to increase the likelihood of it animating NHCs that would
be successful in most contexts. To be sure, these texts (which form and
present the dominant picture of an ideal NHC) have inter alia noted that: (a)
an NHC that is "composed solely of men, for example, or of one particular
ethnic group, is unlikely to reflect the diversity of society and cannot,
therefore be regarded as truly representative"140 ; (b) the complaints procedures of an NHC are useful to those concerned to advance economic and
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social rights (ESC rights) 141; (c) an NHC must strive to overcome the fact that
those persons who are the most vulnerable in a society will most often be
the ones who are the most difficult for the NHC to reach and serve 142; (d) an
NHC must strive to decentralize and may open regional and local offices143 ;
and (e) an NHC should have the power to conduct investigations suo motu
as a way of offering indirect access to those who are the most vulnerable to
human rights abuses (the voices of suffering) such as children, women,
prisoners, the poor, the homeless, the mentally or physically challenged,
and minority populations. Item (a) above addresses gender issues. Item (b)
concerns the often neglected category of ESC rights that are most useful to
the poor and other vulnerable groups. And items (c), (d) and (e) are
addressed to the vast majority of the most vulnerable of societal groups.
Similar requirements for the design and operation of a viable NHC are
contained in the Paris Principles.1 44 Thus to some extent, the UN texts (and
the conception of an ideal NHC that they present) have been informed by
the imperative need to take suffering humanity seriously. Yet these same
texts have not placed the voices of suffering as centrally as they should in
their formulation of the dominant conception of NHCs. Certain concerns
and issues do not appear central to their understandings of what an ideal
NHC should look like. Even more of these issues do not appear to have
influenced this conception at all. The relevant literature shares this failure of
the dominant UN-driven conception of the ideal NHC to fully connect with,
and emphasize, the yearnings and experiences of the most vulnerable
among us. We will explain these points by discussing some, not all, of these
issues/concerns.
In the first instance, the UN texts do not make it compulsory for an NHC
to address ESC rights. The UN Handbook states that: "Human rights
commissions are concerned primarily with the protection of persons against
all forms of discrimination and with the protection of civil and political
1 45

rights."

The UN Handbook did not seem to find this hierarchical marginalization
of ESC rights disturbing at all! As such, it is only fair to conclude that in that
document's view, it is not a central requirement for an ideal NHC to have a
mandate to promote and/or secure ESC rights. Yet, these are the category of
rights that are least likely to be justiciable in the regular courts, 146 and which
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therefore most require protection by alternative bodies such as NHCs!
Again, these are the rights that are often more relevant to the poor than the
rich, and which may most require clarification through the non-judicial fora
of NHCs. 147 Were the UN texts to have been as influenced as they should
have been by the experiences of the voices of suffering, these documents
would have made it compulsory for an ideal NHC to have the jurisdiction to
promote and secure ESC rights. This is not to argue, of course, that this
imperative is ignored entirely in the UN texts, the literature, or in practice.
We have already noted the extent to which the UN texts are cognizant of
the issue, and we have already noted the concern expressed by Gomez and
Sripati with regard to the same matter. The activities of Ghana's NHC, which
treats as central, and deals with, a panoply of those ESC rights that have
been recognized under the Ghanaian constitution, is a good example of the
devotion of some attention to this matter by some of the existing NHCs. 148
Other NHCs, like those in India and South Africa, have also begun to pay
1 49
much more attention to this crucial matter.
Again, the fact that the UN Handbook seems to make it optional for an
NHC to establish regional or local offices is disturbing from the point of
view of most vulnerable groups in most places. As Ayo Obe, the President
of the (Nigerian) Civil Liberties Organization has noted, most NHCs in most
places do their work: ". . . among the poor and oppressed [especially rural
dwellers], for whom a journey to a state capital might mean being in
possession of riches beyond their own dreams of avarice." s0
With regard to this fact of widespread local poverty, and to the vast
numbers of the majority rural populations of most states in the world, it is
disturbing that the UN texts have not made the establishment of local offices
and outposts more central to their conception of the desiderata for an ideal
NHC. However, it must be said in favor of existing NHCs that most of them
have in fact realized the imperative necessity of establishing such grassroots
offices. The Ghana NHC has been a leader in this respect.'-" Whether most
NHCs will in practice set up these grassroots offices remains to be seen.
Another area in which the dominant conception of an ideal NHC
remains unconnected to the voices of suffering is in the area of minority
rights and issues concerning "state fragmentation."1 5 Even though the UN
147.
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texts emphasize the necessity for an NHC to be composed of an "ethnically"
diverse membership, it fails to treat the matter of attention -to the issue of
inter-"ethnic" relations, a fundamental problem in most states of the world,
as one that ought to be central to the mandate of an ideal NHC in most
contexts. The result is that perhaps the greatest root source of human rights
violations in most countries in the world is not highlighted and imagined as
a central concern of NHCs. Would a conception of NHCs that is much more
deeply connected with the voices of suffering the world over treat this issue
as marginal? We think not. It must, however, be said in favor of some
segments of the literature that they do realize the need to make this issue a
central concern of NHCs. For instance, Beckett and Clyde have argued that
given the nature of contemporary British society, in which most human
rights complaints are made by Africans, Indians and Pakistanis-and not by
the Scottish or Welsh regions-the proposed British NHC ought to concentrate on such issue-sections as opposed to regional sections.153
Another matter that would have become central within the dominant
conception of an ideal NHC if it had been as adequately connected to the
voices of suffering is the necessity for the devotion of a large percentage of
an NHC's resources and efforts toward preventive rather than reactive ex
post facto measures. It is a moot point that most vulnerable groups do not
want to remain vulnerable. They also do not want to experience violations
regardless of whether they would eventually obtain redress or not. If this is
so, a sensibility to their yearnings and experiences would dictate the
devotion of a large proportion of an ideal NHC's resources to preventive
rather than reactive activities. Regrettably, this has not been the case. The
UN texts and the dominant conception have not, as well, made this central
to their picture of an ideal NHC. This has led John Hatchard to argue,
convincingly in our view, that NHCs should act as preventive agents.' 54
Yet another matter that is excluded (not just marginalized) from the
dominant conception of the mandate of an NHC is the issue of the human
rights violations within states that are attributable to the activities of foreign
states and the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). For instance, Fateh
Azzam has mapped the various ways in which pressure from Israel and the
USA to put Israeli security concerns well above every other concern is a part
155
of the problem of human rights violations by the Palestinian Authority.
With respect to the activities of IFIs, the Nigerian Nobel laureate Wole
Soyinka has noted how certain policies of these institutions, advertently or
inadvertently, contribute to the immiseration of the mass poor populations
153.
154.
155.
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of African countries.1 6 Indeed, in the context of the massive resistance of
the populations of almost every African country to the structural adjustment
programs (SAPs) that were introduced by the IFIs into these countries in the
1980s, it is fair to ask whether these IFIs did not realize that the adoption of
such SAPs in the face of such intense popular resistance to the SAPs would
(in most cases) require the deployment of dictatorial regimes or policies?
Given the continuance of similar policies and the continuing activities of
many foreign countries within many states, it is surprising, if not disturbing,
that the dominant conception of an ideal NHC seems to exclude these
issues from the purview of NHCs. It does not see such a body as one that
possesses a mandate to tackle such issues. Yet without tackling these issues,
many of the violations that contribute to the oppression of the most
vulnerable in society may never be addressed or redressed effectively.
These are just a few of the issues that illustrate what we view as the
inadequate connection of the dominant conception of the ideal NHC to
voices of suffering. All in all, our suggestion in this subsection has been that
more must be done so as to allow "suffering humanity to reflect" 15 7 their
experiences and yearnings onto the dominant conception of the ideal NHC.
Their experiences and yearnings must be taken more seriously-seriously
enough to become more central to the conception, design and operations of
most NHCs in most places. But for "suffering humanity's experience" to be
taken as seriously as it should by decision-makers, "thinking humanity" (i.e.
those charged with the conceptualization, design and operations of NHCs)
must suffer. They must roll up their sleeves much higher and intensify their
work at the grassroots, among the most vulnerable, among the most urgent
voices of suffering. A conception of an ideal NHC that is as influenced as it
should be by these voices of suffering will have a better chance of animating
the kind of NHCs that would be most viable in most contexts.
Subsection II(C), as a whole, has been devoted to the development of
our argument that the dominant conception of an ideal NHC is incomplete,
and is thus inadequate in a sense that is likely to hamper its ability to inform
the conceptualization, design, and operation of NHCs that would be most
viable in most contexts. The implicit suggestion all through was that even an
NHC that looks like the one that has been conceived in the UN texts and in
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the mainstream literature is not likely to succeed in affecting positively the
human rights situation of the mass population of most states if it does not in
addition pay closer attention to its excessive legalism, insufficient cognition
of popular agency, and inadequate connection to voices of suffering. Such
an extended and enlarged vision of the ideal NHC does provide, at least in
our view, a more holistic conception of such institutions; one that is likely to
be more useful to those who need the services of NHCs the most. The
nature of this holistic conception of an ideal NHC is implicit in the critique
that we have just offered.
In Part III of this paper, we will attempt to assess the mandate and
performance of the Nigerian NHC (NNHC). We will apply the more holistic
conception to this evaluative exercise, and examine the evidence that we
have gathered about the NNHC's mandate and performance against that
conception. Since the holistic conception includes (but extends beyond) the
dominant conception, we will be indirectly assessing the NNHC against
that conception of the ideal type, as well.

III. ASSESSING NIGERIA'S NATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
In this section of the paper, we will examine directly or indirectly: the nature
of the NNHC; its structural framework; the extent of its formal legal
authority; its functions; and its performance in practice. Our overall aim,
here, is to attempt to demonstrate the various ways and senses in which the
NNHC either falls short of our conception of an "ideal" NHC, or does
indeed measure up to that standard. In this last connection, the two broad
questions that we will attempt to provide answers to are: (a) does the NNHC
have features, and has it in practice operated or behaved in ways, that
substantially satisfy the dominant UN-driven conception of an ideal NHC
(especially as enunciated by Reif), and (b) do the structure, powers, and
operations of the NNHC satisfy the more holistic conception of an ideal
NHC? Regrettably, we have come to the conclusion that, on the balance,
and taking into consideration the nature of the local context in which it
must operate, the NNHC does not fare as well as it possibly could when
evaluated against the conceptual "ideal" (as imagined by either model of
the ideal type). It has not performed as creditably as it could on both scores.
However, as we shall soon see, this does not mean that the NNHC has not
been a valuable institution at all. On the contrary, we will make it clear that
the young institution has now become an invaluable addition to the human
rights landscape of Nigeria. This point will be demonstrated shortly.
As we have noted already, the NNHC was established in 1996 by the
military regime led by General Sani Abacha, a government that was perhaps
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Nigeria's most brutal and rapacious (at least since the end of the colonial
era). 15 8 Thus, neither the prenatal or immediately post-natal history of this
institution was particularly brilliant. Quite understandably, the birth of the
NNHC was greeted with widespread cynicism among human rights activists
and scholars, and among almost every other section of the Nigerian
population (with the possible exception of government operatives).,5 9 This
skepticism about the credibility and potential of this body did not abate with
the collapse of the Abacha regime and the subsequent enthronement in
1999 of a democratically elected regime in Nigeria. On 1 July 1999, nearly
three years after the NNHC set up shop and opened to the public, Ita Enang,
a federal parliamentarian was applauded in the Nigerian House of Representatives for asking the following question: "What was the National
Human Rights Commission doing when human rights abuses were going on
[during the General Sani Abacha led military regime]?" 16° This is indicative
of the extraordinarily high level of skepticism that has dogged the NNHC
and its work from its very beginnings.
This negative impression of the NNHC's capacities and performance
continues to loom large in the minds of observers of that institution such as
Hon. Enang despite the fact that even under the Abacha dictatorship, the
NNHC had on many occasions loudly criticized both government officials
and the security agencies for violations of human rights. On one occasion in
1997, Judge P.K. Nwokedi, the founding Chair of the NNHC (who was
appointed by Abacha to that post) publicly described the conduct of the
security agencies as "unjust and atrocious."' 6' In another respect, he
similarly felt able to condemn these same agencies and the government that
appointed him to that office in the following words: "[I]f the truth be told, a
lot of the action [s]
of the law enforcement agents portray the government of
this country as condoning human rights violations."' 62
Thus, the NNHC has never really been the lapdog of the government or
the security agencies. Indeed, Nigerian civil society groups seem to have
caught onto this very early on. For instance, the Constitutional Rights
Journal, the mouthpiece of one of the country's largest human rights NGO
described the above comments of the Chair of the NNHC in the following
terms:
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It came as a surprise, when recently the chairman of the National Human Rights
Commission (a government owned organization) Justice Patrick Nwokedi, just
like other human rights organizations in the country, added another incredibly
operatives, accusing them of flagrant and
hard knock on the nation's security
1 63
gross abuse of human rights.
Again, while the continuance of this skepticism to this day is quite
understandable (from the perspective of the circumstances of the NNHC's
birth), what is most interesting about it is that it has persisted even under the
new more democratic political dispensation. Is its persistence based more
on casual or anecdotal perception than on a systematic evaluation of the
performance of the NNHC?
Whatever the real roots of this now endemic cynicism about the
NNHC, what we will now attempt is to offer an evaluation of the capacity
and performance of the NNHC that is much more systematic than has been
the case thus far. We will do so in two ways. First, we will assess the NNHC
against the "effectiveness criteria" that ground the dominant vision of the
ideal NHC (as enunciated by Reif). These criteria are: independence;
defined jurisdiction; adequate powers; accessibility to the public, level of
cooperation with other bodies, operational efficiency, accountability of the
NHC; the nature of the governance structure of the state; the attitude and
receptivity of the government to the institution; personal character of the
leadership of the NHC; and the NHC's credibility in the eyes of the public.
Secondly, we will extend the evaluative exercise beyond the dominant
model to include the three fundamental concerns that differentiate it from
the more holistic conception. (These are: the absence of excessive legalism,
adequate attention to popular agency, and a deeper connection to "voices
of suffering.")
1. Independence from the Government
Under the law that established it, the members of the NNHC do not enjoy
security of tenure. 1 64 The members of the NNHC's Governing Council,
including its Chair and Executive Secretary, can be removed by the Head of
State, "if [slhe is satisfied that it is not in the interest of the public that the
member should remain in office." 6 1 They are appointed as well by the
Head of State on the recommendation of the Attorney General and Minister
of Justice of the Federation. Moreover, its admittedly diverse 16-person
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membership includes three representatives of the executive branch of
government (namely the representatives of the Ministries of Foreign affairs,
Justice and Internal Affairs).166 Again, the NNHC possesses neither "legal
and operational autonomy" nor "financial autonomy." Section 17 of its
enabling law, the National Human Rights Commission Decree of 1995
(hereinafter "the Decree"), authorizes the Attorney General (AG) to give the
NNHC "such directives of a general nature with regard to the exercise by
the Council of its functions under this Decree." Section 16 requires the
NNHC to submit annual reports to the executive branch of government (the
Federal Executive Council or FEC), through the AG. Just as problematically,
section 1 5 mandates that the NNHC submit its budget through the AG to the
FEC for approval. 167 In Uganda, the practice is quite different. There, the
NHC's administrative expenses are, as they ought to be, charged directly to
the consolidated revenue fund."6 8 It is clear from the foregoing review of the
Decree that it envisages an NNHC that is little more than a "parastatal" or
subordinate agency of the Federal Ministry of Justice! This conception of the
NNHC hardly conduces to a large measure of independence for that body.
In contrast, the Ghana NHC enjoys a very high measure of independence
from any Ministry or Government department. 169 Its members also enjoy

security of tenure. 7 ' In practice though, the NNHC has tried as much as
possible to function independently of the Ministry of Justice. It has not
regarded itself as a branch of the Ministry of Justice at all, and has felt free
to carry out its day-to-day activities as it sees fit. But try as it may, it could
not resist successfully the summary removal without stated cause (in the
year 2000) of its well-regarded first Executive Secretary, Dr. M. Tabi'u, by
the new civilian administration.
On the more positive side, the NNHC is composed of a very diverse
membership. Even though no mention is made of these issues in the Decree,
in practice the NNHC is fairly diverse as to gender and ethnicity. Of the
eight issue-area rapporteurs that were recently appointed from among its
members, a majority (five) are women. Again, both the Northern and the
Southern geopolitical regions of the country are well represented on the
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Governing Council of this commission. The NNHC is also diverse as to its
reflection of the social forces at work in Nigerian society. Section 2 of the
Decree has ensured that it is composed of at least "three representatives of
the registered human rights organizations in Nigeria," three representatives
of the mass media (two of whom must be appointed from the private sector),
two senior legal practitioners, three other persons to represent a variety of
interests, a Chair who shall be a retired judge, and an Executive Secretary.
In this sense, it is even more reflective of the various social forces at play in
society than the Indian NHC. Three of the five non-ex officio members of
the Indian NHC must be judges. 171 And so far neither a female nor a human
172
rights activist has been appointed to that body.
2. Defined Jurisdiction
The Commission has a reasonably well-defined jurisdiction. The preamble
of the Decree makes it clear that the NNHC is to have a broad jurisdiction
aimed at the promotion and protection of human rights. This jurisdiction is
also explicitly stated in the preamble to include the facilitation of Nigeria's
various treaty obligations, and the provision of a forum for public enlightenment and dialogue in the area of human rights. More specifically, section 5
of the Decree clearly sets out the reasonably well-defined, albeit broad,
subject-matter jurisdiction of the NNHC. This includes the jurisdiction to
deal with all matters relating to the protection of human rights as guaranteed
by the Constitution of Nigeria, the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, and other international treaties on human rights to which Nigeria is
a "signatory."1 73 Section 5 also mandates the NNHC to monitor and
investigate cases of human rights violations, assist victims of violations, seek
redress for such victims, undertake studies on all matters pertaining to
human rights, render policy advice to the government, make recommendations to the government, publish reports on the state of human rights in
Nigeria, organize local and international seminars or other events, participate in all relevant international activity, maintain a library, collect data,
disseminate relevant information and materials, and carry out all such other
activities as are necessary or expedient for the performance of its functions
under the Decree. This is a broad and detailed statement of jurisdiction
indeed. Even a strong critic of the Decree such as Osita Ogbu has
recognized that the content of that document is commendable in this
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particular respect. 174 The Decree allows a "broad and generalized" mandate
to the commission, 171 one that is sufficient for it to tackle its admittedly
difficult task of improving, to the extent that it can, the human rights
situation in Nigeria. Moreover, this mandate has been interpreted and
applied in an extremely liberal manner by the NNHC itself. As "AC," one of
the NNHC's senior legal officials, has noted: "The commission has on the
average done a lot of work on all aspects of the mandate vested on it by the
Decree .... No complaint that is sent here is not treated. Even borderline
cases are declared admissible and treated. We take an expansive view of
our mandate. 176 Thus, this is not one of the areas in which either the Decree
or the NNHC itself has fallen short of the "ideal" (whether as imagined by
the dominant conception or by the more holistic kind).
3. Adequate Powers
According to the UN Handbook, "[p]ower must relate to purpose," and an
NHC "must be granted adequate powers to permit the effective discharge of
its responsibilities." 177 Thus, as long as the nature and extent of an NHC's
powers are such as enable it to do all that is necessary to realize its
mandate, such an NHC would be considered to have "adequate" powers.
As we saw above, the powers conferred by law on and exercised in practice
by the NNHC are fairly ample and extensive. It has the power to promote
and protect human rights, receive and investigate complaints, monitor the
human rights situation in the country, provide policy and other advice to the
government, conduct research and studies, mount seminars and other
events, and assist victims of violations, etc. However, the NNHC does lack
a range of powers that the UN Handbook and most scholars in this area
consider as important. These absent powers include the explicitly stated
powers to compel the attendance of a reluctant person at a hearing, compel
the production of any relevant information or document, sue in the regular
courts to enforce its decisions, 78 render binding decisions, and visit the
prisons at any time.
It seems, however, that in practice the NNHC exercises the power to
visit prisons, and that it should be able to compel the attendance of
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witnesses and production of documents. It should be able to do the latter
based on the omnibus, albeit vague, clause in Section 6(a). This provision
permits it "to do such other things as are necessary or expedient for the
performance of its functions under this Decree." In this sense, we do not
quite agree with Osita Ogbu that this specific defect in the adequacy of the
NNHC's powers cannot be cured by reliance on section 6(a) of the
Decree. 17 9 We think that the NNHC should, as it is wont to do, interpret that
provision as generously as is necessary. But having said that, we still agree
with Ogbu and AC18° that the Decree ought to be amended to explicitly
confer the power to compel action or cooperation from any person or
agency, public or private. Section 6(a) may also provide legal authority for
the NNHC to sue in the regular courts to enforce its decisions, especially
since section 5 allows it to "seek appropriate redress and remedies" on
behalf of the victims of human rights violation! Moreover, does not section
1(2) of the Decree permit the NNHC to "sue and be sued in its corporate
name"? Again, we are not averse to the idea of amending the Decree so as
to explicitly state therein that the NNHC is empowered to exercise this
power. In fact, as Quashigah has noted, the failure to itemize all the details
of the powers available to an NHC may in fact be a source of friction
between it, on the one hand, and the security agencies, on the other
hand. 181 Our point is that it can already do so if the Decree is interpreted in
a reasonably liberal way. However, one defect that cannot be cured by
section 6(a) is the NNHC's total lack of the power to render legally binding
decisions. This "defect" can be cured, if necessary, by legislative amendment.
4. The Accessibility of the NHC
As used here, and by the UN Handbook, "accessibility" refers to awareness
of the institution, its physical accessibility, location(s), and accessibility
through its representative composition. As the UN Handbook has put it, an
NHC cannot be accessible to a constituency that is ignorant of or ill
informed about its existence and functions; the absence of NHC offices at
the grassroots often obstruct accessibility for those living in remote areas, or
who are otherwise unable to travel; and the diversity of the composition of
18 2
an NHC may often enhance its accessibility to the public.

On the question of "awareness of the institution," there are preliminary
indications that the NNHC seems to have, somewhat surprisingly, performed quite well among the urban elite. This is borne out by the
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reasonably high scores it obtained when we analyzed the information that
we gathered from two relatively small field surveys. The first was a field
survey of a small randomly selected sample of lawyers who live in Abuja
(Nigeria's capital city) and Enugu (a provincial capital city). 95.65 percent of
those (lawyers) questioned reported knowledge of the existence and
functions of the NNHC. The second was a field survey of a small randomly
selected sample of members of the general public who live in Enugu. 77.5
percent of those surveyed reported knowledge about the existence and
functions of the NNHC. These high numbers are not surprising given the
nature of the day-to-day activities of a lawyer and their high levels of
training and awareness, and given the nature of the other sample as
composed of well-educated urban elite who were selected randomly from
the city's phone book. What is somewhat more remarkable is that virtually
every one of these persons reported that they had learnt about the NNHC
and its functions from the mass media.
While we cannot overgeneralize from the findings of this particular
small random sample conducted in only two urban centers, and given
Nigeria's large population and vast terrain, these findings are a preliminary
indication that the NNHC has (at least in these areas of the country) worked
very hard to publicize its existence and activities in the mass media. To this
extent, the findings do corroborate the NNHC's own assessments of the
extent to which they have afforded a high level of publicity to their work. As
AC has put it, the NNHC has held publicly reported training sessions for the
police and security agencies, and judges; helped form human rights clubs in
4
various secondary schools1 83 ; mounted several radio and television
campaigns (some in collaboration with the Constitutional Rights Project
(CRP), a local NGO); mounted several billboards concerning human rights
awareness; published several magazines, newsletters and reports; held
several seminars,18 1 workshops and conferences. 186 Again, as Bukhari Bello,
the current Executive Secretary of the NNHC has noted in a recent
newspaper interview:
What we do to make people understand what we do is to rotate these [NNHC]
meetings from one state and zone to another. When we get to these [NNHC]
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meetings, we take the whole of the first day to do a lot of publicity campaigns.
We have established what is called [a] human rights forum .... [During such a
forum] we look at a particular problem that is very current in that state and then
we take it as a topic for discussion. Then we invite all stakeholders, the
government, market women, the private sector, everybody with different views
so that we can sit down and discuss... [people do come] from their villages...
18 7
and those issues are discussed and thrashed.
As is evident from this passage, the NNHC has attempted as well to
reach the mass rural majority population of Nigeria. However, as AC has
noted, it has not been as successful as it would like in this regard. In AC's
words, "people at the grassroots may not have benefitted from our activities
but we do have them in mind."188
With regard to its physical accessibility to the public, the NNHC has not
so far performed as commendably. Aside from its headquarters office in
Abuja, Nigeria, the commission has (as at the date of writing) established
just four zonal offices. This failure to establish more offices and become
more accessible to the public may be due in part to the resource problems
that it has faced from the beginning. Yet, when compared to the record of
Ghana's NHC, the five year-record of the NNHC seems quite disturbing. By
1999, the Ghanaian commission had established or was about to establish
a total of 120 offices outside its headquarters office! Most of these were at
the local level. Even though Ghana's NHC was set up over twenty years
ago, the record indicates that it has established an average of five offices a
year as against an average of less than one office a year for the NNHC. Thus,
the evidence is quite clearly suggestive of the fact that the Ghana NHC has
been much more successful at getting itself closer to the grassroots, and at a
rate that was over five times (or 500 percent) more than that of the NNHC!
On the matter of accessibility through a representative composition, as
we have seen already, the Decree has mandated the creation of an NNHC
that is somewhat diverse. The only blot here seems to be that women
constitute only about 37 percent of the membership of the NNHC.18 9
However, when compared to the gender equity statistics among other top
agencies in the country, this number does not seem to fare as badly. It must
be pointed out though that there are no direct representatives of the poorest
Nigerian or of rural dwellers on this commission. It is both by law and in
practice composed entirely of the urban elite. Having said that, it is
noteworthy that the level of diversity required by the Decree concerning the
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NNHC's membership is still significant. 190 This level of diversity has been
reflected as well in the appointments that have so far been made to the
NNHC. On this score, therefore, it is fair to say that in this specific regard,
the NNHC does not fall short of the dominant conception of an ideal NHC.
5. Level of Cooperation with Other Relevant Entities
The NNHC has cooperated very extensively with local human rights NGOS
in Nigeria. It has cooperated with the CRP to establish a thirty-minute
program aired by a local private radio station, entitled "Rights and
Duties."191 As we have already seen, it has been much valued by many of
these groups as an invaluable resource for their own work. It has also
cooperated with the Presidency, and with the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
which is in fact represented on its Governing Council and which supervises
the Nigerian prison system, in securing the liberty of over twelve thousand
detainees who had not been convicted of any offense, or who had
overstayed the terms of their sentences, or for similar reasons.' 9' Additionally, the NNHC has begun to cooperate more closely with international
bodies such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
(ACHPR). It has attended all the sessions of the ACHPR that were held after
it began to function.1 93 Indeed, the NNHC has contributed in what Udeme
Essien has described as an "upsurge" in the number of NHCs that have
participated in the ACHPR's activities. 194 Indeed, the ACHPR's agenda
during all of its 1998 and 1999 sessions has reflected this increasing
interest. 95 As importantly, the NNHC has requested and received technical
assistance from some foreign/international bodies.' 96 Its work has also been
commended by the United Nations. 97
6. Operational Efficiency
According to the UN Handbook, the operational efficiency of an NHC
entails that it must have adequate resources, efficient and effective working
190.
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methods and rules, a competent and diverse staff, an ability to review and
evaluate its own work. The NNHC has to date conducted one major review
and reorganization of its operations. It has put a particular set of its members
in charge of each of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria, appointed eight
issue-area special rapporteurs (five of whom are women) to take special
charge of the work of the NNHC with regard to certain specific themes
(such as the environment and the Niger Delta, the independence of the
judiciary, communal conflicts, detention centers, gender, corruption, extrajudicial killings, and children). 98 Both of these reorganization efforts were
designed to make the work of the commission much more efficient and
effective. The NNHC has also established its own rules of procedure and
admissibility in order to enhance the efficiency of its complaints mechanism.199 We were also impressed by the quality and preparedness, and
diversity, of the staff that we had contact with, especially with the vast
amount, and depth, of knowledge displayed by AC, one of the NNHC's
senior legal staff. The commission has about 50 senior staff and about 48
junior staff (organized into four departments: administration and finance,
public affairs and information, research, planning and statistics, and legal/
investigation). 200 However, the NNHC does not fare as well as it could in the
area of possession of adequate financial resources. Even though it has a
Human Rights Trust Fund of over one hundred million naira (roughly one
million US dollars), that money is strictly devoted to the compensation and
assistance of victims of violations. Thus, it has constantly complained of a
paucity of financial resources. 20 1 However, the commission does have its
own premises, both at its headquarters office and at the zonal offices.
7. The Accountability of the NHC
The UN Handbook views the question of the accountability of an NHC as
involving both its accountability to the executive and/or the Parliament, as
well as its accountability to its clients (the general public). The Decree has
provided for an NNHC that is accountable to the executive and not to
Parliament. As we have seen, under section 16, the NNHC must submit
annual reports to the FEC via the AG. Now, even though the UN Handbook
does permit it, the accountability of the NNHC to the executive (and not to
the legislature) is unhealthy in the specific context of Nigeria. This is so
because a widely acknowledged problem with Nigeria's political history

198.
199.
200.
201.

See NEWSWATCH, 25 Dec. 2000, at 7.
A copy of the rules of procedure is on file with the authors.
Interview with AC, supra note 176.
See GUARDIAN, 13 Dec. 1999 (on file with authors).

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Vol. 24

has been the over concentration of power in the hands of the executive.
Thus, to add in any way to the already extensive powers of the executive is
to further tip the balance of power in favor of the executive. The NNHC
ought to report to Parliament only.
Quite unfortunately, the Decree does not provide at all for the direct
accountability of the NNHC to the general public in Nigeria. In practice
though, the NNHC has tended to be quite concerned with explaining itself
to the public. It has issued a lot of publications, constantly used the media
to explain and promote its mandate, and held various meetings at the
grassroots. It has not, however, conducted any public evaluations of its
activities as the UN Handbook suggests at paragraph 138.
8. The Nature of the Governance Structure of the State and the
Receptivity of the Government to the NHC
For most of the five-year existence of the NNHC, it has had to contend with
a militaristic and generally dictatorial governance structure. These rather
unfortunate "external" circumstances have greatly impeded its work. As
Bukhari Bello, its current Executive Secretary has noted:
During Abacha['s] time, people did complain . . . and the commission made

recommendations, because that is what the law says, that they should make
recommendations to government on what to do. But the government did not do
anything about it. The commission cannot go ahead and enforce its decisions
..even courts and their orders were violated by the [Abacha] government, talk
less [sic] of a commission which does . . .[not have power to enforce its own

decisions] .202
It remains to be seen whether the onset of a civilian regime in Nigeria will
transform entirely the difficult circumstances in which the NNHC has had to
operate. So far, the signals are mixed. While, in the area of prison reform,
the NNHC has had the utmost cooperation of the two regimes (military and
civilian) that have ruled Nigeria from 1999 to the present, 203 the commission
continues to complain of noncompliance with0 4its recommendations by the
security agencies, especially the police force.1
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9. The Personal Character of the NHC's Leadership and its
Credibility in the Eyes of the Public
As we have already seen at the beginning of Part III of this paper, the
founding Chair of the NNHC has been acknowledged, even by an initially
skeptical NGO audience, as courageous, dedicated and outspoken. He
often criticized the Abacha dictatorship that appointed him and worked
closely with the country's human rights NGOs. The founding executive
secretary of the NNHC, Dr. Mohammed Tabi'u, was also similarly regarded
in the NGO community.2 5 Virtually all the members and staff of the NNHC
seem to have been well regarded by most members of the usually very
critical Nigerian human rights movement. This is an important indicator of
the high quality and commitment of the membership and staff of the NNHC.
The current Chair of the NNHC, retired Supreme Court Justice Uche Omo,
and its current executive secretary, Bukhari Bello, have only just recently
assumed their offices. While it is too early to assess their performance and
credibility in the eyes of the public, there are preliminary indications
already of their strength of character, personal commitment, and credibility
in the eyes of the public. They have already reorganized the NNHC,
appointed issue-area special rapporteurs (to enhance the effectiveness of the
commission's work), and opened a number of new zonal offices (to better
serve the public). They have also interpreted their mandate expansively, in
order to better serve the public, 20 6 and even called the executive to order on
a regular basis, reminding it of its obligations under the 1999 Nigerian
Constitution to ensure that the police force does not continue to abuse, and
violate the rights of, Nigerians2 0 7 Again, as we have shown in Part I, Part
I1(C)(2), and at the beginning of Part III of the paper, while the NNHC's birth
was initially met with a great amount of (understandable) skepticism, the
performance of the commission even in the darkest days of military
dictatorship (especially its work as an "inside" ally of the embattled local
NGOs) has led to the steady, even if slow, waning of this skepticism.
However, the commission is still not as well regarded as it should be in
many quarters, and even those who have praised its work, do retain a
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significant amount of doubt as to its ability to do its job effectively (even
under the new civilian dispensation). We will examine the basis of some of
these doubts shortly, as part of our consideration of its connection to the
"voices of suffering," or the lack thereof.
10. The Absence of Excessive Legalism
The [NNHC's enabling] Decree attempts to avoid the pitfall of indulging in
the excessive legalism that has deeply marked (and marred) so much of the
thinking on the subject of NHCs. It tries to do so in a number of ways. For
one, as we have already noted, it provides for a membership that should not
normally consist of a majority of lawyers. Of the sixteen members of the
NNHC, only the chair, the representative of the Ministry of Justice, and the
two members that must be senior lawyers, are required to have a legal
background of any kind.20 8 This is an important feature given the inherently
multidisciplinary nature of human rights, and the need for social pluralism
in its membership. In practice though, the NNHC is presently composed of
a vast majority of lawyers. Ten of its sixteen members have a legal
background of some sort.2 09 However, it is still significant that nearly half of
its membership do not have a legal background.
Again, while the Decree still confers, as it should, court-like (especially
adjudicative) functions on the NNHC, it has not over-emphasized them at
the expense of the non-court-like functions. Indeed these functions occupy
just one of ten of the clauses that itemize the specific functions of the
commission. While it is possible that the Decree was crafted in this way
because the Abacha regime that established the NNHC was wary of setting
up the NHC as a de facto human rights court, it seems highly unlikely that
this was the chief motivation. That regime was famous for its impunity and
routine disobedience of the orders of the regular courts. As such, it could
not have had more fear of a de facto human rights court than it had of the
regular courts.
As importantly, the NNHC does not seem to overestimate the value of
its court-like functions. Indeed, it seems (in general) to have shunned the
pitfall of excessive legalism. As Bukhari Bello has noted "the most important
aspect of the work [done by the NNHC] is to educate the public" 21 0 and the
fact that the Decree does not permit the NNHC to enforce its own decisions
"should not be the only yardstick for assessing us . . . the other yardstick
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should be sensitization of [the] people." 21 1 Thus, both the Decree and the
NNHC's own self-conception seems to shun the pitfall of excessive legalism
as discussed at length in Part I1(C)(1) of this paper. This does not mean that
it does not regard its investigatory, adjudicative, and proposed enforcement
roles as important. It clearly does. On the balance though, it must be
commended for realizing the value of paying as much attention as possible
to its non-court-like roles.
11. The Adequacy of an NHC's Attention to Popular Agency
As we have demonstrated in detail in Part I1(C)(2) of this paper, not only has
the NNHC sought the advice, cooperation, and assistance of Nigerian
human rights NGOs, it has greatly assisted them in a variety of significant
ways. It has organized workshops in association with them, co-hosted a
West African Human Rights Forum (WAHRF) with a consortium of these
NGOs, and issued several reports and publications with them.21 2 As
importantly, the NNHC has recognized as well, the fact that these NGOs are
popular organizations that exercise agency. For instance, AC has noted that
the NNHC cooperates with NGOs "who use us [i.e. the NNHC] to get the
ear of various Governments."213 In this way does this principal legal official
of the NNHC recognize the way in which the commission is available to
civil society and other popular agents as a resource (rather than as a
panacea).
However, it is significant that in AC's estimation, only about 5 percent
of the over 800 complaints that have so far been lodged with the NNHC
have originated from NGOs. The vast majority of these petitions have been
lodged by individual members of the population. Why are these NGOs not
choosing to use the complaints mechanism of the NNHC? The answer may
lie in the results of our survey of NGOs and legal practitioners. This survey
showed that the vast majority preferred to use the regular courts rather than
the complaints mechanism of the NNHC. The reason that was given the
most by respondents was the inability of the NNHC to compel the
enforcement of its own decisions. While this reflects the excessively
legalistic views of most lawyers regarding the matter of the proper role of an
NHC, it is indicative also of the comparative advantage of the regular courts
over NHCs in the adjudication and enforcement of human rights complaints. However, it is also indicative of the fact that unless an NHC is
designed as a virtual human rights court (as is the case with the Canadian
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NHC), it is unlikely to have much appeal vis-A-vis the regular courts, as a
venue for the adjudication of human rights disputes, at least in Nigeria. This
begs the question whether the NHC should not concentrate on or emphasize those functions that the regular courts either do not perform, or do not
usually perform well (such as suo motu investigations and human rights
education).
All in all, one of the most important contributions of the NNHC has
been its work as an ally of, and resource for, human rights NGOs in Nigeria,
especially at the time that they were embattled and groaning under a siege
laid by the dastardly Abacha regime in Nigeria. Few expected it to be
anything more than a lackey of the Abacha regime. The NNHC disappointed them quite remarkably. For this measures of courage and cooperation in the face of a terrible dictatorship, the NNHC must be highly
commended.
12. The Level of an NHC 's Connection to the "Voices of Suffering"
To what extent does the Decree, and has the actual work of the NNHC,
reflected as deeply as it should a connection to the "voices of suffering" (as
already defined in Part I1(C)(3) of this paper? Have the yearnings and
experiences of these voices been reflected as adequately as possible in the
conception, design, and operation of NHCs?
While no provision is made by the Decree for adequate gender equity
in the composition of the NNHC, in practice women have constituted about
40 percent of its membership.2 14 This is hardly an adequate proportion, but
it is significant nevertheless. However, one problem with the representation
of women on the NNHC has been the fact that those women who have
been appointed have not usually been the nominees of women's groups.
The representation of the voices of suffering on the NNHC is also deepened
by the statutory presence of three representatives of the human rights NGOs
that are registered in Nigeria, as well as at least two members of the
independent mass media (one of the possible three may be appointed from
the official media). Quite importantly, in establishing a mandate for the
NNHC, the Decree does not create any kind of hierarchy between civil/
political rights and economic/social rights (ESC rights). The commission is
mandated in section 5 to deal with all "categories" of rights. In practice, the
NNHC has, inter alia, dealt with such ESC rights as the rights to food,
shelter, and adequate clothing of prisoners and detainees, the right to work
of civil servants, and the impact of environmental degradation in the
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Nigerian Niger Delta.2" This is in keeping with the emergent practice within
India's NHC of taking ESC rights much more seriously.2

16

Another way in

which the NHC has attempted to connect more deeply with human
suffering in Nigeria is by its attention to communal conflicts in various parts
of the country. Two examples are its missions regarding the treatment of
both victims and perpetrators after the Umuleri-Aguleri and Kaduna communal disturbances.2 17 The NNHC is also preparing a report on these two
communal clashes that will focus on the prevention of such calamities in
the future. As we have already shown in Part I1(C)(3) of the paper, this is a
fundamental human rights matter in Nigeria, as in most parts of the world.
With regard to India, for instance, Sripati has noted that human rights
violations there ". . . are rooted in deep schisms based not only on acute
economic inequalities, but also caste, creed, religion, gender, social status,
and other characteristics."218
The fact that the NNHC has often acted suo motu2' 9 in investigating
violations of human rights that come to its attention through the mass media
is highly commendable as well.2 2 0 Other ways in which the NNHC has
attempted to connect at a deeper level with human suffering include: its
habit of investigating even those complaints that have been made against
private violators of human rights221 ; and its conduct of periodic and

unscheduled visits to prisons and other places of detention in order to
monitor the compliance of the relevant agencies with the rights of the
detainees. 22 2 Indeed, its very effective work regarding the rights of prisoners
22
and detainees has been its greatest achievement so far. 1
However, the NNHC's failure to establish offices at the grassroots (it has
established only four offices in the last five years for a population of over
one hundred and twenty million people) is a big impediment to its efforts to
reach and aid the millions of "suffering humanity" that populate the country.
It should have at least one office in every local government area in Nigeria,
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i.e at least 400 such offices). This is crucial since a majority of the
population in Nigeria consists of poor rural dwellers who can ill afford a
journey to the capital to seek redress for abuses committed against them.
Moreover, most of the serious human rights abuses that occur in Nigeria
happen in these remote rural locations away from the scrutiny of mostly
urban-based mass media and NGOs. Thus, compared to the four zonal
offices that it presently maintains, the NNHC still has a very long way to go
in this crucial area.
Again, the fact that the NNHC has received only about 800 complaints
in the five years that it has existed (an average of 160 per annum) is
disturbing, and is certainly connected to its absence at the grassroots.
Compared to Nigeria's huge population, and the frequency of even those
violations that are reported in the popular media, this number of petitions is
relatively insignificant. In its first six years of existence, the Indian NHC
received over 120,000 petitions (an average of 20,000 per annum).2 24 Even
if it is considered that India's population is about 10 times that of Nigeria,
the Indian NHC's docket is still disproportionately larger. However, the
blame for the paucity of petitions in the NNHC's docket must be shared
with the human rights NGOs and other popular agents. For even though the
NNHC can and does act suo motu, a body such as the NNHC still requires
to be mobilized more adequately by civil society in order to enlarge its
docket. However, the Nigerian Government must retain the bulk of the
2 25
blame (for failing to resource the commission as adequately as possible).
As it gains in credibility and establishes itself much more firmly, its docket
should increase considerably. On the other hand, the fact that about 95
percent of its docket has been filled by complaints lodged by ordinary
Nigerians themselves, as opposed to NGOs, is commendable. It is an
indication of their connection at some level with the yearnings and
experience of such average citizens.
On the whole, and quite regrettably, we must conclude that there
remains a huge gap between the NNHC and ordinary Nigerians, especially
the voices of suffering. Despite its many strengths, and its many conscious
efforts to reach these voices, the NNHC remains, even by its own
admission, an urban-based elitist-oriented institution. Without closing this
gap substantially, it will be most difficult, if not impossible, for the NNHC to
(as it should) transform positively the human rights situation of the vast
majority of Nigerians. The point is not that it does not realize that it does
have to make more effort in this direction. The point is that its efforts have
not so far met with success.
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE NIGERIAN
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
In the foregoing parts of this paper, we have argued: (a) that the UN has
formulated and applied a set of standards for the evaluation of NHCs,
standards that have together constituted the dominant conception of an
ideal NHC; that this dominant UN-driven conception of the ideal NHC is
shared by virtually every scholar, nongovernmental organization, and
governmental body that has commented on the effectiveness of NHCs; and
that this dominant conception is significantly limited, and requires fundamental enlargement and revision if the NHCs that are animated by its vision
are to have a significantly increased transformative potential. Such an
enlarged, revised, and more holistic vision of NHCs was then offered in the
last section of Part II of the paper. The purpose of this reevaluation of the
dominant conception was to deepen, extend, and enlarge the UN-driven
dominant conception of NHCs, and not to abandon the principal markers of
that conception entirely. Finally, in Part III of the paper, we assessed the
performance of the NNHC in the first five years of its existence. Our
evaluation of this young institution was animated by the more holistic
conception of the ideal NHC that we developed in Part II of the paper
(which encompasses the principal markers of the UN conception.
In particular, our evaluation of the NNHC revealed that institution has
performed most creditably in the area of the promotion and protection of
prisoners' rights, 2 26 the expansive interpretation of its mandate, the creation

of awareness of its existence and activities among the urban-based elite, the
diversity of its membership, cooperation with other entities, availability as
an ally/resource for the work of popular agents, operational efficiency,
commitment of its leadership to the human rights struggle, avoidance of
excessive legalism, and a limited attention to the voices of suffering.
Another area in which the NNHC has done particularly well is in raising
awareness within Nigeria regarding the need to reform its overall legal
framework, especially amending the Decree. It has even gone as far as
producing, in consultation with Tony Anyanwu (who is a prominent
parliamentarian), a draft legislation seeking to amend the Decree. 227 This
draft legislation aims at strengthening the NNHC's independence from the
executive branch of government; securing its financial autonomy; granting
it the explicit power to bring legal proceedings in the courts on behalf of
victims of abuses; as well as granting it the explicit power to compel the
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cooperation of any person, secure any information or document, and enter
and search any premises. These are all very necessary powers and bear
explicit reference in the legal framework that guides the NNHC's activities.
With regard to the NNHC's work in some of these areas, Soli Sorabjee,
the then UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights in Nigeria, felt able to say that: "The National Human Rights
Commission (of Nigeria) is doing commendable work in the field of human
rights. It has undertaken several important initiatives, including a study of
prison conditions and human rights promotional activities in conjunction
with NGOs and in the field of human rights education."2 2 Thus, at least
some of the NNHC's work has been recognized as significant even outside
Nigeria.
However, the NNHC has not performed as creditably in some other
areas. It has failed to profoundly affect as much as it could the overall
human rights situation in Nigeria. It lacks some of the powers that are
necessary to do its work effectively; has not been as physically accessible as
possible to the bulk of Nigeria's mass urban poor or mass rural dwellers; has
not been funded adequately; has not connected as much as is possible with
the voices of suffering that form a huge segment of Nigeria's population, and
has not been successful in getting the legislature and the executive to
"domesticate" most of the human rights instruments that have been ratified
by Nigeria. As a Nigerian high court judge has put it, while the NNHC has
probably transformed positively the human rights situation of most Nigerian
prisoners and detainees, it has not been as successful regarding other areas
of human rights promotion and protection, such as the treatment of women,
the state of the educational system, the treatment of students' union activists,
and the environment. 2 9 Still, the NNHC's flexible procedures, educational
and preventive orientation, and its ability to investigate and adjudicate
complaints at minimal costs (if any at all) to the complainant commend it to
the poor, the needy and the oppressed as a potentially effective and credible
alternative to the often highly technical and expensive procedures of the
regular courts.
Yet, despite its comparative advantage in some areas vis-A-vis the
regular courts, the future of the NNHC could be bleak if the government
does not sufficiently empower and resource it, and if it does not reinvent
itself so as to be much more proactive, mass-oriented than it has been so far.
For instance, thus far, the NNHC has not been as bold as it could be in
interpreting section 6(a) of the Decree (which permits it to do such other
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things as are necessary or expedient for the performance of its functions
under the Decree). Quite surprisingly to us, and in a departure from its usual
liberal construction of that Decree, it seems to have interpreted that
provision in a rather narrow way. It has interpreted it as not permitting it to
sue in court on behalf of victims of human rights abuses. Yet, sections 1 and
5 permit the NNHC to seek redress for, and assist, such persons. Would the
NNHC not therefore be permitted by section 6(a) to sue in court in order to
assist, or seek redress for, such victims? Another way in which the NNHC
might reinvent itself is by it requiring all government departments and the
security agents to submit annual or bi-annual reports to its Governing
Council on their efforts to ensure the conformity of their conduct with the
human rights obligations that have been assumed by Nigeria (either
domestically or internationally).2 30 Clearly, the NNHC could comfortably do
so pursuant to its section 5 powers to "monitor and investigate all alleged
cases of human rights violations in Nigeria" and "undertake studies on all
matters pertaining to human rights." Yet another indication that the NNHC
has not been able to do all that it can within its current legal framework is
that it has not reviewed and presented a commentary on the compatibility of
existing laws with Nigeria's international obligations; a project that is
undoubtedly authorized by the Decree.231
However, it will be naive to expect from the NNHC much more than it
is designed for, or able to, deliver. This point seems superfluous at first until
it is realized that far too many scholars seem to have too high an
expectation regarding the ability of NHCs to transform positively their target
societies. Brilliant as they often are, such scholars seem to view the ideal
NHC as a kind of panacea, as opposed to a resource. For instance, Fateh
Azzam has declared in frustration that: "Sadly, and despite serious effort [by
the Palestinian NHC] and some tangible progress, human rights violations
continue in the Palestinian territories ....
,,2"2 It is almost as if Azzam
imagines that there will come a day when human rights violations will cease
completely in the Palestinian territories, and that if that happens, the
activities of the Palestinian NHC will be the principal reason for this new
dispensation! Nowhere in the world is the flawless observance of human
rights a mass cultural fact. And if history has taught us anything, it is that
even the most democratic countries are prone to commit even egregious
human rights abuses under certain circumstances. Thus, we cannot expect
any NHC, no matter how powerful or endowed, to cause the cessation of
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The authors are grateful to NCC for providing us with this insight. See id.
For instance, the Palestinian NHC has reviewed and commented on over 13 laws,
including the Basic Law. See Azzam, supra note 76, at 343-44.
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human rights abuses. The best NHC can only contribute to the reduction in
the frequency of the incidences of abuse. Even the best NHC cannot
eradicate human rights violations from the body politic. Even an ideal kind
of NHC can only become a valuable resource, and not a panacea.2 31 We
should therefore not expect too much from these institutions lest we fail to
appreciate fully the significance of their usually modest accomplishments.
There is no good reason to imagine or view the NNHC's performance any
differently. With this last caveat in mind, our general view of the NNHC's
first and very difficult five years is that while that young institution has been
"far less than a saviour" it has also been "much more than a sham." Like the
Palestinian NHC, it has: "succeeded in helping many individual victims of
violations to gain redress, and in making human rights [more of] an issue of
concern in the political lexicon ... [prevalent in Nigeria]." 214 Should it
continue to move in this same general direction, it has the potential of
becoming a great institution.
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